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The Fourth Mysticism

JOHN REDWOOD ANDERSON

PART II: A NEW SYNTHESIS

IN my treatment of the traditional systems it may seem that I was pleading for the utmost denial and asceticism, and this is true in so far as I was speaking of specific Christian mysticism. To set out on the Christian mystical life—union with a totally transcendent and personal God: union through love—without accepting an entire renunciation of “the world the flesh, and the devil,” is to set out on a course of self-deception, of compromise, and of ultimate untruth. I am talking here of the mystic only: in the life of the ordinary Christian, any rivalry between the love of the Creator and the love of a creature rarely arises, and to most the mere question would appear meaningless.

But now let me attempt some barest outline of my own position. I believe that, over and above the three main types of mysticism of which we have spoken, yet a fourth type exists. This type is found occasionally within religion itself, but more frequently outside, or alongside, of religion. It has as yet no organised form or practice: indeed, it cannot be said yet to possess any definite theology or philosophy, though some writers, such as Berdyaev and Ouspensky, get very near to it in places. It exists rather in hints scattered here and there, and most frequently in the poets: in Wordsworth, Blake, Walt Whitman and Goethe in chief; though here, again, it exists more as feeling than as idea. If the reader will refer to our map, (*pp* 88-90), he will notice that all the forms of mysticism we have so far discussed have nothing to do with the Intelligible World as such. It has been either a straight aiming at the Absolute, the One-Alone; or, as in the Orgiastic cults, an aiming at some aspect or energy of the Many of the One-and-Many relationship; or, again, as in Christianity, an aiming at God personally regarded, at the One of this same One-and-Many relationship—a movement of the creature towards the Creator. Now, the fourth kind of mysticism is none of these, though it contains the essence of them all: it is aiming at the One of the *One-Many-relationship*, τὸ ἐν πολλὰ. But this One-Many relationship is something quite different from the One-and-Many relationships, and is the only real relationship. The cosmic and individual drama may very succinctly be put as follows: God becomes the World, and Man, as the apex of the World; and, conversely, Man and through Man the World becomes God. But God, becoming the World, yet remains God; and Man, becoming God, yet remains Man. But none of this would be conceivable if God, Man, and Nature were three distinct things—or if God and the World were two distinct things: it is

only conceivable if, within this trinity, or this duality, there subsists an unbroken unity. Where, in the Sensible World, an individual member of the Many (and, in turn, the whole Many) stands over against God as something, or someone, distinct from Him and by Him created, in the Intelligible World, an individual member of the Many (and, in turn, the whole Many) is a *function* of the organic and unique Whole that is the One of this One-Many: a function of that Whole which is God.

A brief digression is here necessary, in order to make two points a little clearer. First, and to avoid confusion, it must be remarked that the difference between the One-Alone and the One of the One-Many relationship is a *real* difference—that is, it is a difference rooted in the Divine Nature itself: the difference between Eckhart's *Gottheit* and *Gott*, and, in some respects, the difference between Boehme's *Ungrund* and *Gott*, or that, again, between Whitehead's "Creativity" and "God." It is the difference between the transpersonal Ground of existence, itself "beyond existence" (οὐκ ἔστι), and the fullness of total experience which is the Mind or Life of God. It does not depend in any sense on any finite point of view. The difference, on the other hand, between the One of the One-Many relationship and the One of the One-and-Many relationship depends wholly, as I hope to make clearer, on the finite point of view: between these there is no metaphysically real difference. And, secondly, a word to explain a little more fully what I mean by God becoming the World, though I can here put this only in the briefest possible way: it would require a treatise in itself. The One-Alone may be regarded, on the one hand, as the fulness of infinite Being, self-known, but beyond any subject-object relationship, and, on the other hand, as the total absence of all concrete and specific experience. It is, so to speak, the desire, the nature, the law, of this One-Alone to translate its abstract and transpersonal fullness into concrete personal experience that is the root and reason of the World's existence. But to do this, there must arise within the One-Alone a single all-inclusive sphere of experience, on the one hand, and, on the other, and as its necessary complement—since fullness, or maximum, of concrete experience must be multiple as well as single—an innumerable (possibly infinite) host of finite and mutually exclusive centres of personal experience. This single and all-inclusive sphere of experience is "God," the One of the One-Many and One-and-Many relationships: it is the totality of concrete experience, and is personal, though its "personality" is of a unique type, and utterly unlike that of any finite being, since in it the Many are included (without any confusion between the individuals composing that Many, any "compounding of consciousness"—it is a real multiplicity) as organs of its single Organism. The host of finite and mutually exclusive centres of experience is "the World." And these two, the One and the Many,

are together the Organism in which, and through which, the One-Alone acquires that concrete experience otherwise impossible to it. But, further, the One-Alone is not in any sense changed, or destroyed, or disseminated, by the precipitation within it of the One-Many: it remains, as it were, in the background, eternally itself and unchanged. Yet the coming to being within it of God and the World—or, rather, of the living divine Universe, the One-Many—is in no sense a “mere appearance,” in no sense *Maya*: that is where this type of Organic Philosophy* differs so radically from the stricter form of the Vedānta. The above is, I know, a very concentrated résumé, but it may help to clear up certain points in what is to follow, while, in its turn, what is to follow may, in some measure, elucidate this résumé. But to return to our main theme.

The One-Many relationship is very difficult to make clear: in fact, strictly speaking, it cannot be expressed in the terms of our logic at all. Not even Plotinus succeeds. But perhaps it may be got at indirectly. A symphony is not the mere result of its constituent notes and phrases; in a sense, it precedes these and orders them, and they exist not only for their own sakes but, even more, and more importantly, for the sake of the whole that they mediate. Each phrase is, in fact, a musical *function* of the whole—otherwise it would have no significance, and so be redundant and irrelevant—and each note is, in its turn, a function of the phrase to which it belongs. The phrase exists for its own sake, has its own beauty and significance, but it exists simultaneously for the sake of the whole, and is a functional part of the beauty and significance of that whole: “In creation’s unrolling arras one self-creative design.”

But nothing can make this relationship really clear as a non-self-contradictory intellectual proposition, first, because it is *sui generis*—it has no exact similitude—and secondly, because it does not belong to the world of the intellect at all. It can only be known in so far as it is lived. Instead of Berkeley’s *esse est percipi*, I should say *vivere est cognoscere*.

Now, Christian thought, partly under the influence of its own Judaic tradition, transformed the Intelligible World of Plotinus into the “Heaven” where God and his angels (virtually personifications of the One and the Many of the One-Many relationship) dwell; but it did worse: for it transferred the mutual exclusiveness of Creator and creature, characteristic of thought in the Sensible World—since the angels also were created by God—to the Intelligible World itself, which, in this way, became an idealised replica of this world. One thing, however, the Christian world-map retained from Plotinus, as well as from Judaism and from all primitive thinking, and that was, if I may so express myself, the topographical situations of these two worlds: the Sensible World was situated “here below”;

*cf. the final section of Whitehead’s *Process and Reality*.

the Intelligible World, now "Heaven," was situated "yonder," as both Plotinus and Eckhart say, or "above." My point here is that, for both these schemes and for the mysticism based upon them, or of which these were the outcome, Earth and Heaven were regarded as two states (where, indeed, they were not looked upon as two localities) placed vertically one above the other. Hence, to pass from Earth to Heaven—one way of expressing the mystical endeavour—was necessarily to abandon Earth and all the things of Earth. Nothing earthly—not your wife, your son, your dearest friend: not art, nor science, nor even well-doing—could be loved or pursued save "for God's sake": never for themselves alone; and here, perhaps, enters the greatest clash between the secular and the religious views and estimates of life—a clash that, I believe, nothing but the Fourth Mysticism can resolve. Now, I can say in essence all that I have to say, though it may not sound very intelligible in such a concentrated form, by saying that I do not agree with, or believe in, this topographical stratification of these two "Worlds." *There are not two Worlds*: there is only one—one seen from two different and opposing points of view: from the periphery, from where it appears as the world of the One-and-Many, our familiar and almost inescapable view-point; or from the centre, from where that world, without the change of a single feature, appears as the world of the One-Many—the view-point of God. There is no "above" or "below," no "yonder" and "here": there is only a "within" and a "without"; and the mystical life essentially consists in passing from the "without" into the "within." In this passage from the without to the within of the same world, two things should be abundantly clear—and here I come directly to our main question: first, nothing is abandoned, or left behind, or denied; and secondly, all attachment to the outside view-point must go.

As an example, and as a crucial case: *A* may love *B* as if they were two separate points on the periphery of reality; then the relations of *A* to *B* and of *B* to *A* are not directly, or consciously, concerned with the relation of either, or the relation of their relationship, to *x*, the Centre of that reality; and this is the condition of all purely personal love, except, of course, the "personal" love of man for God. But *A* may love *B*, and *B* may love *A*, not as two separate peripheral existences, but as two related functions of *x*. Their relationship to one another is not the less personal, neither loves the other "for *x*'s sake"; but here no conflict between their love for each other and the love of either or both for *x* (their relationship to the Centre) can arise, since that very mutual love of *A* and *B* is itself an experience and a realisation of their fundamental and functional relation to *x*. In their mutual love, God loves.

And here, another digression: In every act of experience two experiencers are involved: every object of experience is an object to

two subjects. One of these subjects is the finite experiencer—you, me, the cat, the dog, an atom or an archangel—and the other is God. The matter of experience is identically the same for both subjects: the manner of experiencing, infinitely different. I experience, for instance, the taste of an apple—a complex, not a simple, experience, since it includes all my reactions, recognised or unrecognised, to that taste: that is the matter of the experience. Precisely that matter—that is, the taste of the apple *as I taste it* plus all my reactions to it, physical, psychical, mental, and spiritual—is simultaneously experienced by God (the One of the One-Many relationship) and precisely as I experience it. But, whereas my private experience as one of the finite Many is limited to myself—not shared, that is, by any other of the Many—and further limited to a particular place and a particular time, that identical experience, as experienced in the total consciousness of God, is not so limited: it is experienced now in relation to all other experiences past and present, whether of myself or of any and every other finite experiencer in the total Universe. It finds its place in the total contemporary pattern of experience (the space-aspect of my finite experience) on the one hand, and in the total succession of events (the time-aspect of my finite experience) on the other. For me, it is, so far, a purely temporal and temporary, experience, to disappear as all other such experiences disappear; for God, on the contrary, it becomes an organic part of the total “living past” (which is not memory), for God’s “time” (not “eternity”) is, somewhat like Bergson’s *Durée*, a *solid* time, an ever-growing four-square column of life, not, like ours, a string of merely successive moments. In this way our flying moments are caught and eternised in God, and in Him find their final, and ultimately only true significance; while, without us, the finite Many, God could have no concrete experience at all.

But to return. I said that the mutual love of *A* and *B* is itself an experience and realisation of their fundamental and functional relation to *x* (and this, whether they themselves know it or not)—that in their mutual love, God loves: for *A* and *B*, self-ends themselves, are simultaneously two of the organs in which, and by which, God experiences. The trouble begins when man asserts his peripheral position to be central: this is Original Sin. All asceticism is designed to break the mortal hold of this egocentric and anthropocentric obsession. One should not abandon the world, one should embrace the world: but this is safe and right only when one has abandoned oneself. It is not attachment to an object of desire, whatever that object may be, that is a barrier to the spiritual life, but attachment to oneself *in that attachment*. I do not mean admiration without desire for possession, though this is an excellent and happy state, if a little unnatural: I mean an inner detachment—not indifference, another false trail—even in possessing and in the desire to possess. If we could remember that all our experiences are not only ours—

not our exclusive private property and concern—but also and identically God's: if we could remember that we are not only ends in ourselves, but also means to the total End: not only self-active organisms (I speak spiritually), but also organs in the Divine Organism—if we could remember this single and simple fact, we should be very near to the mystical life as this Fourth Mysticism conceives and experiences it. We should do nothing we were ashamed of, since in our shame God is also ashamed; we should not wittingly do anything to another's hurt, since in that hurt God is also hurt—and in the hurt thereby done to ourselves God is again hurt. We should be living then *as if* we lived "within" and not "without," and this discipline, this asceticism which forgoes all and nothing, would in the end lead to that passage I spoke of: to being conscious not only of, but in, the real world—the inner world of the Divine Life itself, which is *this* world, "the world of all of us," as lived by, and known to, God. It is in this way that man, redeeming himself—or allowing himself to be redeemed—redeems Nature. In the great symbolism of the Christian Myth, the very *flesh* of Jesus rises from the tomb and ascends to heaven: but, first, it had to be dead and buried. Neither St. Douceline nor the Curé d'Ars were right. The sweet smell of a flower is neither a reminder of God's goodness nor a temptation to lead men away from God: it is, in literal and sober truth, the very perfume of God Himself. But, strange as it may seem, both the method of St. Douceline and that of the Curé d'Ars are far easier to follow than the one I here recommend. For, while the glory of the Universe—and its pain and tragedy also—is, indeed, the glory of God, it is so fatally easy to see in it either *only* the glory of the Universe or *only* the glory of God. So, too, in the sufferings of this world, we tend to see only the sufferings of this world, and to forget that they are no less God's own sufferings; while, on the other hand, the devout Christian, contemplating the sufferings of God in the crucified Christ, forgets that these are no less the sufferings of man and of the world. We drive the nails into Christ's hands and feet, and, in so doing, nail ourselves to the cross. Again, in the betterment of the world, we tend, once more, either to "leave it to God in His own good time," or to take it wholly upon our own shoulders—once more forgetting that this is the task of two wills willing simultaneously and concordantly: the redeemed will of man and the hidden will of God in man. In my love for my fellow, it is easy to love him only for his own sake or only for God's and so to forget that this "either—or" tendency is a fault and a delusion of my own finitude and no true choice: so I damage my love for my fellow by not realising (in thought and in feeling) that it is simultaneously my love of God, and by cutting it off in this way from the Whole of things in which it is alone true and real; and I damage my love of God by not realising that it is simultaneously my love of my fellow, and so, by making God a Person among persons, introducing the element

of rivalry between these two loves, which should be one and the same. In the spiritual world, that is, the real world, there neither is nor can be any rivalry or opposition.

But the mere understanding of this depends upon abandoning the whole theory of Creation. God could not *be* one, or any, or any number, of His "creatures"; but God, while remaining unchangeably God (I do not mean unchanged, since all concrete experience involves change), is simultaneously all His "modes," His finite *manners* of existing. He is not, in reality, the One of the One-and-Many relationship—no *re del universo*, above and apart from His world, a Person among persons: He is only the One of the One-Many relationship, the very Life of the Universe—the very Universe itself *totally understood*—which is, at once, one and unique and also indefinitely (perhaps, infinitely) multiple; and this unity and this multiplicity are both real: neither is the mere appearance of the other. God is not a Person among persons, for all that our "sensible" intellects compel us so to think of Him, but a Person whose very "organs" are themselves persons—their personalities finite and mutually totally exclusive; His, infinite (at least in one sense) and totally inclusive. For only these two poles of existence, the exclusive finite Many and the inclusive infinite One, can together give that maximum experience which must, of necessity, be the characteristic of the Divine Totality—of the Universe experiencing itself. Nor is this pure Pantheism, though I am by no means afraid of that terrible word, for, though the One-Many is an inseparable whole (as thinker and thought are), the Many are not the One, nor do they constitute it, and the One is not the Many. Not the One-and-Many in any sense can be ultimately true: only the One-Many; and this, while it can be known by living, cannot be grasped by thought. It contradicts the Law of Contradiction and passes to a new logic. Incomprehensible and self-contradictory as it may be or seem, it is nevertheless an experienced fact, and, as experienced, perfectly simple and self-evident.

With regard to our special question—the relation of sense-experience to spiritual experience—let me take an analogy, once more, from art: for art alone gives us, or attempts to give us, an image of complete and significant experience. Nearly all our ordinary experience is non-significant: that is, it is full of irrelevancies. I am absorbed, let us say, in contemplating a sunset, to take a trivial example: my surroundings are otherwise forgotten, and, in so far as the sunset, as experienced, becomes, or tends to become, my whole field of consciousness, just so far is that field of consciousness wholly significant. By this I do not mean significant of something not itself: it is not symbolically significant; but in it no element is non-significant, not-contributory to the whole effect, in a word, irrelevant. But now a wandering fly settles on my face; instantly

the irrelevant enters my total conscious state, and may well ruin the very significance of the sunset experience and destroy the pleasure I was taking in it. If you will reflect, you will see that ninety-nine hundredths of our customary significant experiences are set in a chaotic sea of non-significance—like little islands always in danger of being submerged. If they are related to one another, they are, again, related as are the islands of the Aleutian Archipelago, and not as parts of one continuous tongue of land. This non-significant background to all our moments of complete or partial significance is the necessary result of our finitude—of our finite perception. Could we see from all time and simultaneously all the events of the Universe—see them from inside as well as from outside—nothing could appear as irrelevant to the whole pattern: there would be no non-significant matrix, but a single all-comprehending significance, and that, in turn, means a single all-comprehending truth and beauty and rightness. This is the characteristic of the Divine Experience; and this can, in its measure, be known and shared by the soul that has abandoned its peripheral isolation and, with it, its peripheral—that is, its parochial—interests, and taken up a central position and assumed therewith its cosmopolitan and metropolitan interests and responsibilities. This is, in essence, the Unitive Life as this fourth type of mysticism conceives and knows it. But now, after this necessary preamble, let us go back to my similitude from art. Say you are listening to Strauss's "Tod und Verklärung" (I choose this because (a) it is a single continuous piece in which, there being no breaks or discrete sections, it is very easy to "lose" oneself, and (b) because it is "programme music," that is, it has a distinct and intellectually separable "idea" as its foundation). Now, there are two quite distinct ways in which you can listen to this music. You may allow yourself to become wholly absorbed in the music as a complex of sound and of your emotional reactions to this sound: you forget yourself completely: you have allowed the music temporarily to invade, almost to become, your whole consciousness. This gives you an experience of maximum intensity, and, if the music has embodied itself in you, you have no less embodied yourself in the music, it has for the time being become your whole self-expression. This is one of the important truths in the aesthetic theory of *Einfühlung*. You have, too, an experience of maximum significance, in so far as the emotional content, the sensuous element, of that music is concerned. But you may, on the contrary, abstract yourself from this welter of organised emotion and its stimulating sense-experience of sound: you may regard the whole as the exfoliation of the "idea"—here, the idea of death and of enlightenment after death*—and, forbidding yourself to become

* Obviously, in what is called "pure music" there is no such separable intellectual, or literary, idea: here the "idea" is a musical idea—a theme, or phrase, or a succession of such. Nevertheless, here too the formal structure may be appreciated independently of its embodiment and elaboration in sound.

absorbed, or engulfed, by the sensuous element of the music, you may attend to, and appreciate, its musical structure almost as a thing apart from its sound-plus-emotion content. You may even read it in the score, and so, getting rid of all but the mental suggestion of sound, enjoy it simply and solely as structure. To adapt the old Greek distinction: by the first method you revitalise, and are revitalised by, the Matter of the composition, and, while you are wholly absorbed in this Matter, while it is living in you and imposing upon you its own sound-and-emotion content, you will necessarily be in complete ignorance of its Form. And conversely, while you are abstracted from the Matter of the composition and absorbed in its Form, you will necessarily have sacrificed all the sound-and-emotion content of its Matter. The vast majority of people listen to music in the first way only: many of them would hardly recognise the mere re-entry of a subject or theme. They have their reward: they live for the nonce a life other than, and better than, their own—"better" because more organised and, hence, more significant and more intense, even while it is so much less "personal" (or in part, perhaps, *because* it is so much less personal)—they are rapt out of themselves into something greater: and all this is a necessary element in the proper hearing of music. But such listeners are, on the other hand, almost completely unaware of the structure of the music they hear—of the idea, or series of ideas, which are the organising Form of this Matter: how many, listening to a Bach Fugue, recognise even the entries of all the voices on every occasion, let alone the more complex structure? how many recognise the *stretto*, or even know what a *stretto* is? But the Form of a composition is its very directing spirit—the emotion-sound complex is but its body. If Form were for an instant to forgo its function, to cease to dominate the whole down to its least part, chaos would supervene. There is an *intelligible* beauty of Form, as there is a *sensible* beauty of Matter—and both are indispensable. The second is the Dionysiac beauty (that is, the second type of mystical experience); the first is the Apollonian beauty, and leads to ecstatic contemplation (that is, the third, or specifically Christian, type of mysticism). There is always the earth "without form and void"—*tohu bohu*, in the thrilling words of the Hebrew—and there is always the Spirit of God brooding upon the face of the waters: without these two there is no creation—at least, in the artistic sense. Now, it will be obvious that the only complete hearing of music is a simultaneous and equal experience of both its Matter and its Form. This is extraordinarily difficult, and comparatively few achieve it. At most, we listen, say, first to the Matter (or Form) and then to the Form (or Matter), making do with successively different hearings, or a rapid alternation between the two methods. But nothing short of the simultaneous employment of both methods gives us the completely significant whole. Dionysus and Apollo must both preside: more, while retaining each his special function—Dionysus, his

immanence, and Apollo, his transcendence—these two Gods must become one God.

Now, if the first way of listening to music be similar to the Orgiastic type of mystical experience, and the second way to the Christian type, this simultaneous practice of both ways is similar to what I have called the Fourth Type of mysticism. It is a life completely identified with ordinary experience, on the one hand (though it, too, has its "ecstasies"), and completely dominating it and abstracted from it, on the other. It is the simultaneous presence—not fusion—of the Matter and the Form of any experience as these are both equally realised in consciousness. It is the simultaneous vision of God in the World and of the World in God, without for a moment confounding the Immanence with the Transcendence, and without for a moment denying either. The soul must plunge into the chaos of common experience, lovingly soak itself in sense (and senselessness), taste all to its dregs of pleasure or pain: and equally, the soul must lift itself up beyond all experience, penetrate it and understand it, in lonely and utter abstraction: and the soul must perform these opposite and contradictory actions simultaneously. Man must live his life as man, a finite being here on this earth, with his individual and finite values, his individual desires, his loves and his hates, his joys and his sorrows: and, *at the same time*, man must live that life and realise it as a function of the organic life of the Whole—an autonomous organ of the Divine Experience. This is, I believe, the whole secret of how to experience rightly—a secret nobody ever tells us.

Let me close by relating an experience that may throw some light on the foregoing attempt to explain this fourth kind of mysticism. I was once climbing with two others on the Crib Goch ridge of Snowdon. There was so dense a mist that all I could see was a few feet of rock before me and, swaying over this, the end of the rope disappearing into space. At the same time, there was a bitter and furious wind, a wind so strong that, in places, one dared not stand upright but had to crawl on one's belly along the knife-edge of the ridge. And this cold wind had brought on a vile and agonising toothache. So here were two simultaneous experiences—the joy and excitement of climbing and the pain of the toothache—each of which was irrelevant to the other. The toothache prevented any "whole of experience" so far as the climbing was concerned: I could not give myself up unreservedly to the joy of it; while, since safety depended at almost every step on a fixed attention to the climbing, I could not give myself up to the pain of the toothache. The two experiences pulled in different directions, and each destroyed the completeness and, hence, the significance of the other. They were like a theme and counter-theme in music, which could be heard together but not understood together, and my mind alternated perpetually between the two. I had then never so much as dreamt

of this fourth type of mysticism, nor of any final *method* of experiencing; but, supposing I could have abstracted myself from both these experiences, from the joy of the climb and from the pain of the toothache, it is immensely probable that I could have combined them into a single significant whole of experience, some synthesis that would have been entirely new. The theme and the counter-theme could now have been understood, and not merely heard, together—as Browning says, though in a different context: “not a fourth note, but a star.” This is a mere indication of method: out of this non-significant chaos I might have been able to create a significant cosmos: out of this ugliness to have made beauty—for, in the last analysis, beauty is simply our spiritual recognition and appreciation of significance. Only the irrelevant is the ugly. Art attains complete relevance by the elimination of all irrelevancies, and so gives us a pattern, and a foretaste, of the Divine Experience; but, in that Experience, relevance is not attained by elimination, but, on the contrary, is the necessary result of total inclusion. Such a total inclusion is, of course, beyond the capacity of any finite being, but it is the characteristic condition of the infinite and orchestral consciousness of God; and such a total inclusion means that not a single event in space or in time is isolated from the Whole, and therefore not a single event is without its due significance in itself and its due “position” in the significant Whole—not a sparrow falls to the ground without the Father. This is that “Absolute Beauty” that we are for ever seeking and for ever escapes us, and this Absolute Beauty is not a Platonic “Idea,” but the Divine Life itself as that is submitted to the Divine Judgment. And this total Beauty is also the total Truth and the total Good, for in the Divine Judgment these three are one. In these three, and as such, the Universe judges and enjoys itself.

I trust that the foregoing has gone some way towards answering the main question we set out to examine. Our “Sensible World” is but a peripheral view-point of God’s “Intelligible World”—peripheral, and therefore distorted. If we knew and admitted this, namely, that we do stand on the periphery and not at the centre, a great deal of confused thinking, as well as evil action and unnecessary sorrow and bewilderment, would be avoided. But this we will not do: each one of us must be, we are convinced, the centre of his own world of experience, an experience he confounds with the Total Experience, in kind if not in degree, and to which he wrongfully attaches an absolute value, and so we see everything out of its proper perspective, and literally make our own chaos—our own non-significant universe. The spiritual business of man is to exchange his peripheral view-point for the central view-point: to see with God’s own eyes; and so, while still being man, to share the very life of God. And in this exchange, he does not abandon the world, but only his subjection to the world: he does not leave the

world, he takes it with him: his "flesh" as well as his spirit must "ascend into heaven." The Form and Matter of experience must be simultaneously and equally grasped: without Form, we have nothing but chaos; without Matter, only the archetypes of what can never exist—prenatal ghosts that can never find their incarnation. The soul must aim, first, alternately, then simultaneously, *both* at a complete immersion in, and savouring of, the world—of sense, emotion, action, and intellect—and at a complete inner abstraction from, and exaltation above, the world. And these are but two moments in the single act of the realisation of God as the One-Many. Perhaps, when all is said and done, and with proper regard to this new interpretation of the "idea of God," the easiest and the simplest way of reaching this goal is that recommended long ago by Brother Lawrence: the Practice of the Presence of God. Or, if we would put what is, for me, essentially the same thing in more modern and less theological language, we could do no better than quote the words of Emile Verhaeren:

" L'homme dans l'univers n'a qu'un maître, lui-même,
Et l'univers entier est ce maître dans lui."

But as a last word: Beyond the One-Many lies the infinitely mysterious, the incomprehensible One-Alone, and it, too, if but for a moment, can now and then be reached. Beyond the "life" of God is the Divine Being. For this "flight of the alone to the Alone," the demand of Plotinus remains true: ἄφελε πάντα, "Abandon all"—even God, for, as in Eckhart's words, "God becomes and unbecomes." In the approach to this Ultimate, even truth and beauty and the good are hindrances, and only a love that knows neither loved nor lover can be our passport.

Creation and Evil

E. L. ALLEN, M.A., Ph.D., D.D.

I DO not pretend to offer a solution of the problem of evil within the compass of one short article. Indeed, I would prefer with Marcel to speak of the mystery of evil rather than the problem. A problem is something we can separate from ourselves and examine, while a mystery is something in which we are ourselves involved and with which therefore we have to live. A problem can be disposed of, a mystery will always remain with us. I am only concerned to deal with one small aspect of the question. If I entrust a workman with some material, that he may do a job for me, and I find then that the job is done less adequately than I had wished, I do not blame him if he is able to show that the fault is not his, but is due entirely to a defect in the material I handed over to him. No one is held responsible for evil when this is due to the conditions within which he perforce acted. Is it possible that something of the kind applies even to God? The suggestion that God's power in creation is limited may appear repugnant at first, but it has had such respectable advocacy that it at least deserves to be examined.

Three considerations especially have prompted some modern thinkers to toy with the idea of a finite God. In the first place, the waste and indirection of the evolutionary process led Bergson to use language that put a new interpretation on creation. "*It is as if a vague and formless being, whom we may call, as we will, man or superman, had sought to realize himself, and had succeeded only by abandoning part of himself on the way.*"⁽¹⁾ In the second place, the whole modern outlook tended to emphasize goodness rather than power, whether in God or man. If this goodness could be maintained in face of pain, tragedy, and sin by the sacrifice of his power, the price seemed no longer too high to pay. Finally, it seems doubtful whether omnipotence in the sense of ability to do anything and everything—and even McTaggart could declare that no other definition of omnipotence made sense⁽²⁾—was at all desirable. Perfect goodness and unlimited power are in fact incompatible. Goodness reveals itself in our experience as the refusal to wield certain kinds of power or to perform certain kinds of actions. A limitation in power would therefore seem to be no discredit.

The boldest attempt to work out what creation would involve under such conditions is still that of Plato in his *Timaeus*. What he

¹ *Creative Evolution*, 281.

² *Some Dogmas of Religion*.

describes is, to be sure, the making of the world rather than the creation of it, for the Demiourgos brings the cosmos into being as a living being, including within itself subordinate makers who fill in, as it were, the outline he provided at the outset. He does this with his eyes upon the Pattern, the eternal form that is to be reproduced here below. But what he is able to do is, throughout, conditioned by the material in which he works. To this various names are given; it is the receptacle, or chaos, or necessity, or the errant cause. It has no positive characteristics of its own, but is passive and can take on any form that the Demiourgos wills to give it. It is not to be equated, as necessity, with any system of pre-existing uniformities; Plato does not mean that there is a fixed order of nature within which the work has to be done. Necessity has the sense rather of that which is not subject to control and has to be accepted as brute fact. We may speak of it therefore simply as the Given.

When the Neo-Platonists made matter the source of all evil they were only developing the master's thought. The Christian Church repudiated this conception, affirming that creation was *ex nihilo*. So doing, it substituted one myth for another, since no account of creation can ever be other than—in Plato's words—"a likely story." But a myth is not exempt from criticism. We may ask whether, in Plato's scheme, the Demiourgos was free to create or not. If he was, then he must be held responsible for there being so imperfect a world as this, since he could have declined to bring it into existence. If he was not free to create, then his work was done under some kind of constraint. To that extent, he was unfortunate, and, while we may give him our pity, we can hardly worship him. There is also the difficulty of accepting the receptacle or prime matter as ultimate equally with the Demiourgos. Perhaps, however, that is to overstress the myth, and we should be content to say with F. M. Cornford that Plato presents us with a logical analysis of the world of our experience under the form of a story of origins⁽¹⁾.

In our own time, A. N. Whitehead has given us a fresh and suggestive version of the *Timaeus*-myth. His description of what he calls "the formative elements" in "the all-inclusive universe" yields three factors. These are creativity, the realm of ideal entities, and God as "the actual but non-temporal entity whereby the indetermination of mere creativity is transmuted into a determinate freedom"⁽²⁾. These correspond respectively to the receptacle, the forms, and the Demiourgos. Berdyaev follows Boehme, but is equally disposed to limit the power of God in creation by a pre-existent material. To this he gives the name of "meonic freedom," and, since this freedom is identical with creativity, he approximates at this point to Whitehead. God and freedom emerge together from the Abyss, and what the former can do is conditioned by what the

¹ F. M. Cornford: *Plato's Cosmology*.

² *Religion in the Making*, 90.

latter allows. Berdyaev urges that it is only in this way that the presence of evil in the world can be made tolerable. It is rooted in "the powerlessness of the creator to avert the evil resulting from the freedom which he has not created"⁽¹⁾

In all these views so far considered, God is thought of as limited by some material outside himself upon which he works. For Leibnitz, what we have termed the Given is rather to be found in the laws of reason, the conditions under which everything must exist that does exist and to which, therefore, even God's creative activity is subject⁽²⁾. We may say that God is bound by what is practicable; he cannot have one set of conditions save as he is willing to forego another set that is excluded thereby. Thus he cannot create a world in which we implicate each other in our good actions but are insulated as regards our evil actions. Solidarity and isolation cannot co-exist. The number of practicable worlds, if we may use such an expression, is therefore strictly limited. There is one actual world only, and our myth can speak of God as choosing this from the number of practicable worlds present to his intelligence. On what basis will his choice be made? Since he is all-good, we must suppose that he will elect to create the best possible world. The existing world is therefore such.

The conclusion reached by Leibnitz has been criticised as shallow optimism, and Voltaire's *Candide* has effectually discredited it. But it has only done so by misrepresenting it. For the description of this as the best of all possible worlds was never meant by Leibnitz to apply to all the detail in it but only to its general character. He was prepared to justify the action of God in endowing men with freedom, since without that, character would have been impossible; but he did not propose to justify the subsequent misuse men have made of their freedom. His argument simply is that the grave defects of our world are necessarily associated with the advantages it offers, and that if we had had some other world in which those defects did not arise, we should have lost rather than gained on balance, since those advantages would have been withheld from us. The merit of Leibnitz is that he makes reason rather than matter the necessity that is binding upon God; the difficulty remains that this is something external to him, so that he appears almost to act under constraint.

The next step is therefore to place the limit within God himself. That is done by Hastings Rashdall⁽³⁾. He draws a distinction between God's nature and his will. "He is limited by his own eternal, if you like 'necessary' nature—a nature which wills eternally the best which that nature has in it to create." This is self-limitation "as arising from the presence of that idea of the best that is eternally present to a will whose potentialities are limited." "The eternal

¹ *The Destiny of Man*, 34.

² *Principles of Nature and Grace*.

³ In *Personal Idealism*, ed. Henry Sturt, 391.

verities" are thus lodged within the divine being. I must confess, however, that it is not easy to understand what is meant by the distinction between God's nature and his will; nor does the appeal to the Second Person of the Trinity mend matters. One would have thought that the unity of God would exclude from his being the kind of possibility that is here envisaged. A much more determined and elaborate effort to deal with the question of evil by the hypothesis of a finite God is that of E. S. Brightman, and to this we now turn.

He feels so keenly the importance of this topic that he devotes to it a quite disproportionate share of his *Philosophy of Religion*. He examines in great detail what he rightly calls "the problem of good-and-evil" rather than of evil *simpliciter*. He then considers the solution offered by "theistic absolutism" and rejects it. For him, the supreme difficulty is the existence of "surd evil," by which he means anything that "is inherently and irreducibly evil and contains within itself no principle of development or improvement." He cites the case of imbecility and draws attention to "the intrinsic worthlessness of the imbecile's existence and the suffering which his existence imposes upon others"⁽¹⁾. His own solution is to place the limit to God's activity within his being, as Rashdall does, but to define more fully of what it consists. "The Given consists of the eternal, uncreated laws of reason and also of equally eternal and uncreated processes of non-rational consciousness which exhibit all the ultimate qualities of sense-objects (*qualia*), disorderly impulses and desires, such experiences as pain and suffering, the forms of space and time, and whatever in God is the source of surd evil." All this "is eternal within the experience of God and hence had no other origin than God's eternal being," but "it is not a product of will or created activity"⁽²⁾.

This is clear enough. We know now, if Brightman is correct, whence evil arose and where responsibility for it is to be placed. It belongs to the very being of God himself. But if one problem has been solved, has not a more serious one been created in the process? It is scarcely possible to call good the God who has thus been described to us. He resembles the Absolute of philosophy rather than the God of religion. As such, he includes so much we are bound to reject that we cannot offer him worship. Brightman's personalism has reached a conclusion little different from that of absolute idealism. Nothing is saved when the inexplicable and the objectionable are thrust wholesale into God, with the saving clause that these belong to his being rather than his will. Is he like a man who struggles in vain against his temperament? This promise of a final solution of our difficulty turns out to be the least satisfactory so far considered.

¹ *Op. cit.*, 140.

² *Ibid.*, 186f.

It is now possible to review the argument pursued to this point and to offer a conclusion of one's own. We must think of God as limited and definite. He must be such, if he is to exclude and oppose what is evil. Equally, as has been urged already, there is nothing laudable in the mere possession and exercise of unlimited power. That would be arbitrary and therefore morally repugnant. We must rid our minds once and for all of any lingering notion that God is the absolute despot of the universe, free to do precisely as he wills and even to break the laws he has himself made. To think of him thus is to sacrifice goodness to power. God therefore must be supposed to work within limits, simply because the alternative would be caprice, and caprice is the negation of goodness. But we shall not unnaturally be reluctant to speak of the "powerlessness" of God as Berdyaev does. Perhaps the solution of our problem lies not in the repudiation of power as such but in the discovery of just what the kind of power is that goodness will employ. The Given that acts as a limit to God must be placed within him and not outside him, as a necessity to which he is subject. But is there a limit that does not restrict, that in fact releases power?

I would answer that there is. If God is love, we have precisely the situation we are seeking. For it is the property of love to express itself by calling into being that which is other than itself, that which indeed is independent of itself, lives its own life and decides its own course. Love only comes into play when a level is reached beyond the manipulation of objects, and its characteristic is to respect the freedom of others, even to the extent of allowing them to use that freedom against itself. It confers upon them rights against itself and scrupulously respects those rights. In so doing, we can say that it limits itself. But that does not imply any acceptance of conditions with which it would prefer to dispense, if it could. This self-limitation is at the same time self-fulfilment. Love reaches its goal in the creation of that which is capable of response, and which is free to give it or refuse it. To be sure, love is not indifferent to the result of its appeal; it can guide and persuade till it has won the response it seeks, but it will not coerce.

The point I wish to make is that the activity by which perfect goodness limits itself is also that by which it expresses itself. If therefore creation is thought of as the bringing into being of creativity, if our myth is taken, not from the manipulation of a material but from the realm of freedom and the respect God himself pays to this, we have a Given that is within God, a limit that is part of his being, yet need not think of him as restricted in any way. We may therefore regard each of the three levels of matter, life, and mind as an enterprise that God brings into being, each with its own urge to change and development and each with the laws that set limits within which that urge must work. Each enterprise enjoys its measure of autonomy. What that means at the human level we can see clearly, since we ourselves belong to it and are

conscious of our freedom. At the level of life, the concept of creative evolution lends itself to such a picture of the relation between God and the world as is here proposed. And do we not know now that the so-called material world is rather a realm of energy, of activity, of dynamic change?

What light does such a conception throw on the problem of evil from which we set out? It is clear that God, as the Creator of creativity, is responsible for the possibility of evil, both non-moral and moral. He has brought into being a realm of things in which error, pain, and sin may arise, and he has done this because it is his nature to do so, because, being goodness, he expresses himself thus. But he is not responsible for the particular instances of error, pain, and sin that arise within his creation; the transition from possibility to actuality takes place within the enterprises he calls into being and by the exercise of their initiative. No particular human tragedy can therefore be carried back to God as something willed by him, though the possibility of there being such a thing as that tragedy is his doing. In which case God accepts responsibility for the suffering and evil that arise in the world, both in the sense that he is in fact responsible for them as possibilities and in the sense that he takes upon himself what arises apart from, and even in opposition to, his will, that he may transmute it into good by a patient effort of redemption. This is the meaning of the Cross.

One final point. Is God so described finite? I would answer by asking precisely what is meant in this connection by the terms "finite" and "infinite." God, I would suggest, is finite if his resources of wisdom and love can be exhausted, if we could come to an end of him. He is infinite if this is not so. Nothing that has been said above would imply that God is finite in this sense, which is the only one of religious value. He is infinite because, however much human need may draw upon his succour, his ability to help is still unimpaired and unimpooverished. That God is limited we must allow; this, as I have urged, does not mean that he is in some respect impotent, but that he is good and therefore has only that power, and all that power, that is consonant with goodness.

The Necessity of Religion

A. E. MORGAN, M.A., LL.D.

FOR centuries mankind has had a belief. Conscious, as all man must be, of the world beyond material fact he has had some formula which gave sufficient solution of the mystery to satisfy. However much remained unexplained he had a faith which enabled him to reconcile the comprehensible with the incomprehensible and to maintain his poise in a world of wonder. Without a working hypothesis which satisfies, no man can answer the great questions, "Whence?" "Why?" and "Whither?"; and without an answer to those questions man is not firmly balanced as he walks through life.

Christendom is the story of belief in certain fundamentals of faith which gave sufficient answers to these great questions. There was a welter of quarrelling over doctrine and interpretation, but the bases were accepted. The existence of man on earth, the purpose of his life and his ultimate destination were not mysteries. The churches of Christendom all agreed broadly in their explanations of these three problems and therefore they were not mysteries.

But with the growth of rationalism, which sprang from the Renaissance, developed during the eighteenth century and finally took on the weapons of inductive science, the old beliefs were gradually undermined. For centuries reputable society backed the churches in their fight against this invasion of their ground and repelled the onslaught with every spiritual and temporal weapon they could command; but before the end of the nineteenth century scepticism had passed beyond the reach of overt persecution and agnosticism was respectable. After long years the stronghold of dogmatic Christianity was breached by the forces of rationalism. But that did not mean the destruction of the Christian religion or of the Christian churches. By successful propaganda the Roman Church has maintained a position of great strength and the protestant churches have saved their position by a masterly elastic defence. But they are both weakened. Today we have a situation in which millions pay lip tribute to churches in whose doctrines they do not really believe, carried along on an easy tide of compliance which does not demand vigour from the swimmer.

If we face facts honestly and confess the truth we must admit that in this country the large majority of people look upon church or chapel chiefly as an institution necessary for respectable society, to which they turn for certain rites—baptism, marriage, burial—

conventionally performed by a religious officer. Many, and perhaps more than a few years ago, but still a small minority, find through the churches the satisfaction of a real need; but even of those it is very doubtful if more than a small number attend Christian worship without considerable reservation of belief in the theology which underlies it. A vast number of people may not question these dogmas, but that is at most a negative form of belief; and of these many would at least shrug incredulously if they were forced to assert that they really believe in such doctrines as the divine creation (as they have been taught it), the trinitarian nature of God, the virgin birth or the Resurrection. Others more discriminating rationally would refuse belief in the idea of a personal God or the operation of prayer in the realm of natural phenomena, or the efficacy of the Atonement. Yet with disbelief on all these points they may find in worship something which satisfies a need and are prepared to accept the whole in a vague way because of their hunger for something which the church can give them.

The great fact of which they are sure is the hunger. Many others are not conscious of this hunger. They have been hungry once: but the appetite has passed with starvation. With the young in spirit or in years the hunger is keen: the hunger for satisfaction of the questionings, of the desire to see into the mystery of things. The young crave to solve the riddle of life; but after years of silence to the questioning it becomes less obstinate, and a time arrives when the questions are silenced and life is taken for granted. "I shall know, being old." But if age does not know it will no longer seek. The young have always wondered and the answers were ready to hand. The firm bases of Christian theology and morality, closely interlocked, were a sure foundation. Youth asked; age answered with assurance; youth accepted. Youth still asks; age lacks assurance; youth is baffled.

This is a very serious situation and it is unique in the history of civilized man. The solvent rationalism which had done its work by the end of the nineteenth century was at first destructive, and in so far as it cleared away the obscurantist clutter of a bygone day its work was healthy. It is a good thing to pull down a rickety building, but if it is a man's only shelter he needs another home or he will be at the mercy of the elements. That is just what modern rationalism has done: it could not help it. As science has made incredible much theology which was credible in an earlier day it was inevitable that beliefs should perish. The situation is unique because to-day man's spirit has no credible answers to the great questions which life poses. We give answers to our children, without really believing them: the children grow, shape the questions very sharply to themselves and do not believe the answers. Man wants as much as ever to know whence, why and whither: but the old answers are sere and no one has any fresh ones.

But it is more than a question of a hungering for answers posed by the intellect. Man is conscious of an undefined but very real sense of the world outside and beyond his own personality. The richer his personality the deeper that consciousness. In youth this is especially real. The sense of yearning to get at and to encompass a fuller life, to satisfy the deeper emotions which stir to love, to admiration for beauty, to emulation of nobility, to self-sacrifice, is not a figment which the reason can destroy. Motions of the spirit transcending the commonsense of everyday profit and loss are a reality in the personality of man, seeking to express themselves in worship. A recognition of something or someone beyond self, and greatly desirable, more desirable even than the little wants of common life, is what worship springs from. To worship is to wonder and to admire: the Romans had only the one word—*admirare*. To worship is to expand, to give the spirit the nourishment by which it grows, the exercise of the soul in a freer atmosphere where it can gain the suppleness without which we atrophy.

There are many ways in which we can worship. The admiration of great lives, the appreciation of beauty in nature and in art may effect that transcendence of self which turns the spirit outwards and raises it beyond self to higher reaches. They may serve as the upward stretch which induces flexibility and growth; and if they are on the bent knee of humility before greatness they will strengthen the soul still more. In so far as the traditional service of church worship meets these needs it attracts, because these needs are eternal. Unfortunately the medium is so repugnant to modern reason that millions who are atheist refuse to bend the knee in what to them is a house of Rimmon, of a God whom the churches fashion in terms which rational man cannot accept.

Religion has traditionally embodied two functions: it has answered the great questions of life and it has provided the medium of worship. There is no necessity for linking them inextricably. But in its decay it has suddenly left Christendom lacking in both respects. This presents a very great danger. As we answer the questions about life so will our conduct of life be affected. From the answers of Christianity have sprung the moral code which is the basis of our present stage of civilization, which in the last few centuries worked to a culmination in humanitarianism and in political democracy. The central point of the Christian doctrine is the divine quality of the individual, and from that premise flows the importance of so organizing society that each shall have the opportunity of realizing all his potentiality. Democracy is the political expression of that doctrine: however far we may be from a full realization at least we see it as the beacon of our political faith. On it is built the whole structure of our ethical edifice. We may have botched the building at many points, but there is the principle of its architecture.

It is surprising that in these latter years so little has been said of the real meaning of the present world struggle. The imperfection and slowness of democratic practice, and its inherent difficulty as a political system, disheartened and disgusted millions, who were consequently an easy prey to ambitious adventurers and deluded imposters preaching a new gospel. Nazism and fascism were not merely anti-ecclesiastical, they were blasphemies against the faith in the essential importance of the individual. Now in its onslaught on democracy communism attacks the belief which Christian and atheist alike have taken out of the traditional Christian theology and ethic and have made their dearest tenet. We have become so irreligious in form that there has been no call in the clarion tones that might have been expected that here was an enemy of our faith—the faith of all. So fearful are we of using the terms of religion that we have not dared to call this struggle what it really is—a religious war, a crusade. Our leaders during the Great War, thinking, quite unjustifiably, that the democracies had become wholly materialistic dared only to call on us to save our skins. We rightly staked all in the defence of unjustly attacked nations and of innocent people foully robbed, tortured and murdered. But the real issue is far deeper: we were fighting for the way of life which we believe to be the only way to a better world. Our masters and even our pastors were strangely silent in this matter.

The danger is that morals having been associated so long with religion the decay of belief in the traditional religious forms will loosen the moral structure. There is no reason why it should so long as it is given another basis. One of the most powerful foundations of morals is reason, and the philosophers as guides to wisdom have been among the greatest moral forces. To aver, as some do, that without formal religion there is no firm substance of right conduct is merely untrue. There have been and there are many lives which give it the lie. But it is a more difficult way.

A potent factor in human conduct is emotion. Moreover where reason is undeveloped the emotions may be strong, and many religions, as for example that of the Roman church or the Salvation Army, have exploited the fact that the ignorant and the uneducated whose reason is ill-developed may yet respond ethically to strong suggestion through the emotions. Both exploit fear—the fear of punishment, here and hereafter. Both make a strong appeal through sound and sight playing direct on the feelings which are worked up into a state of frenzy or ecstasy in which self is subordinated to the suggestion of a higher way of life.

Emotional exploitation of this kind offends the taste of many and may drive away more discriminating spirits. But the chief reason why people fall away from this kind of worship is because it is linked with a creed against which their reason revolts. The outward forms of worship may make an appeal to the most sensitive and discriminating souls and give play to and induce the highest

spiritual aspirations, but if they are to hold men and women to-day they must be rid of the old bones of the past. Take prayer for example. Many who value the spiritual exercise of silent awe and self-examination and the common uplifting of the spirit in a setting beautiful to sight and hearing will forgo this purging and elevating experience because they feel that they will be asked to accept ideas that seem nonsense to the modern mind, and they are unwilling to partake in an act which seems to commit them either to an implied profession of belief or to the charge of hypocrisy, or leaves them in an ambiguous state which the poet in another sense called a willing suspension of disbelief. For many this will not work, and the worship is robbed of its essence.

The whole panoply of worship is so cluttered with the obsolete that millions of men and women reject it all, even what they can believe. They are shy to use the very name of God except in jest or as an oath, although tradition of a seemingly harmless kind will carry most atheists through the prayer to God to save the King. The reason is not that people do not believe in God. They do believe that there is some power outside the material world of phenomena. They do believe that behind and beyond the world of inorganic and organic matter is a force or an entity which their reason demands but does not comprehend. What they do not believe is that this power is anything like what they have been told that God is. They do not believe in a personal God, still less in a God who was reborn in human form, of a woman, without human impregnation, that he was raised from the dead and was restored in human form to some undefined place called heaven, and is now mysteriously both tripartite and unitary, and is not only interested in the lives of mortal men but will respond in some unexplained way to the requests of men who want Him to meddle with the laws of nature. Increasing millions of men and women do not and will not believe these things. Nor will they put any trust in churches which maintain these doctrines as their basic tenets, nor will they be satisfied if in order to meet the rising force of disbelief the churches trim their creeds by lopping off here and there what is more obviously incredible or try to bamboozle people by explaining them in terms of symbol. The sturdier creeds like the Roman Catholic will hold many for long through ignorance and fear, but in the end they will be utterly rejected by enlightened reason. The trimmers will wilt neglected.

This does not mean that the Christian churches are doomed to sudden extinction. They will last for many a day even if they retain relatively unchanged the creeds on which they are at present based; and for several reasons. In the first place their roots strike very deep into tradition and social habit. The Anglican church in particular has a weighty social pull with the inertia of respectability tipping down its side of the scale. But its weakness compared with the Roman Church is that it sealed its doom when at the Reformation it allowed the private individual to exercise his own reason in matters of faith.

The Roman Church demands all or nothing in belief and strengthens its hold by threats and promises and by silencing question with awe-inspiring authority. It is natural that it should be strongest among the most ignorant classes, and it buttresses its position by its octopus hold on the education of the children of Roman Catholics. In this way it can impress the plastic mind of the young with such terrific force with its tenets and its practices that in after life it holds them unless their reasons are emancipated and they bolt. Another source of strength of the Roman church is its insistence on breeding children. It sets great store by sheer force of numbers and does all it can to induce breeding however disastrous the results may be to parents and children.

But these reasons alone would not in themselves preserve any church. The source of the vitality of the churches—so far as they are vital—is that they meet a real human need. Faced by the grand puzzle of life man demands an answer according to which he can fashion some *modus vivendi*, and until his natural instincts wither from disuse he wants a means of exercising the spiritual and emotional capacities and of realizing the aspirations which find expression in worship. Man wants to revere something outside and above himself: he wants to stretch out to something greater and more beautiful than himself. He wants to feed his wonder and to feel awed by a reverent contemplation of the most high. These spiritual exercises are the way to growth and to discipline of the soul in acquiring the strength to take it up the steep places and the balanced gait to enable it to keep footing on the knife-edge path of life. Wanting this, men and women have recourse to what offers to meet their need. This is the traditional service of the churches, which will continue to hold those whose thirst is so great that it must be slaked. Most men and women living to-day have been taught in childhood that the churches are the fountain, and naturally when they are thirsty it is to the churches that they go. Gradually however more and more are not being so taught in their youth, gradually more and more are discovering that these waters do not quench, or that they are mixed with such strange ingredients that they would rather suck a stone.

In times of prevalent emotional stress such as a great war the human demand for a comforting explanation of the agonizing riddle of life and for an outlet through worship of feelings too violent to be contained will send men and women back to the churches, and great distress will overcome the hesitancy to accept the unacceptable. Sometimes one hears the argument that the truth of the churches is shown by the fact that the sceptic returns to the bosom of the church for comfort in his hours of weakness and distress. Surely that is an admission of the invalidity of the church. A church which was founded on the truth would make its strongest appeal to men when they are fittest to use their reason untrammelled and undistracted by weakness and distress.

This essay is not designed in any way to attack religion, but rather to lament that the churches, the only recognized spiritual gymnasia, are so weak, and are likely to become weaker. They may become popular on a surge of evanescent spiritual fervour due to such a stirring event as a war or a national disaster; they may increase their popularity by adventitious aids such as sightlier buildings, richer vestments, nobler music. But so long as the means of worship which they provide, or the answers which they give to the eternal questions are linked with creeds which modern education is destroying, they cannot be strong. To say that is to state an appalling fact. If there is any truth in the belief that these questions must be answered and that means of worship must be provided if man is to grow to full stature and live to the best of his capacity then it is indeed appalling that the churches which once bore that responsibility are unable to fulfil it.

Nothing could have shown more vividly and dramatically than the events of the war years the error of thinking that the mass of men and women were mainly influenced by selfish, materialistic motives. The display of fellowship, generosity, cheerful sacrifice of wealth, comfort and life itself reached a pitch hardly seen in the history of mankind. That civilized man is superficially marked by cynicism is true. A dreadful feature of this country is the bitter aimlessness of so many of the young. As Noel Coward put it twenty-five years ago, the state of youth was "a sort of hopelessness which isn't quite despair, not localized enough for that. A formless, deserted boredom, everything eliminated, whittled right down to essentials, essentials which aren't there." But it was only the shallow observers who held that this sprang from any degeneracy of spirit. The spirit was sound but it lacked the means of development or the medium of expression. Why is it that the Young Communist League has such a strong hold on so many young men and women? Because it appeals to their idealism and, what is no less important, assigns them a job which gives it expression. In time of war the medium of expression is more accessible to youth. There is full employment and there are ways of devotion, with a desirable flavouring of excitement which peace fails to offer. But there is also a backwater of boredom, caused partly by satiety, partly by fatigue; but still more by the fact that when the first glow of activity is past the obstinate questionings recur. What does this life—to-day a wildly mad life—really mean? Are we really made to hurt and destroy each other, to perish in agony in mid-career? Does even the glow of heroic admiration and action satisfy the deepest need to transcend self?

And youth answers No. Its negative may be mere vacant boredom and selfishness in the unthinking, or baffled anxiety among the minority who are trying to puzzle out the riddle. Youth to-day certainly needs and to some extent is seeking for a religion. There is no more urgent problem than to discover how mankind shall regain

some foothold to replace the older foothold which Christianity has provided for nearly two thousand years. Until man has succeeded in this task he will be the toy of the violent currents which make up the swirl of life. Science has resulted simultaneously in destroying his faith and equipping him with physical strength a thousandfold greater than anything he could formerly command. It is one of the most tragic episodes in his history that these two facts should have synchronized. Just when he needed the clearest understanding of the meaning and the ends of life and the skill to use these new powers aright he began to lose such faith as might have enabled him to keep a true course.

Such ability as he has is rooted in the ancient faith. Ethically he has in many ways progressed in the centuries that have seen the rise of democracy and the expansion of opportunity for the development of personality in conditions of slowly broadening freedom. The inspiration of this progress has been the Christian ethic and it is highly significant that the most evil men pay lip service to the Christian code. It has not been sufficiently noted that Adolf Hitler in his worst acts of aggression, whether against the persons of German people or against other nations, used the most elaborate casuistry to give his wicked acts an appearance of accord with the accepted morality of Christianity and democracy. No one has made more play with the idea of freedom as a justification of his tyrannic measures. He made vast pretence that his aggressive acts were defensive. By his apt quotation of scripture the devil admits where truth is to be found.

About the truth of Christian ethics there is little doubt and less dispute. It stands in the main as a code that man believes in. But ethics is not enough: it may be closely linked to religion, but essentially it is not religion, although it may be one of its most important by-products. A religion man must have, and it must be one which helps him to answer the eternal questions and gives him the means of achieving that amplitude of the spirit which comes from worship.

In so far as the development of natural science has discovered bits of the answers, religion must include what he has discovered through the painful exercise of his rational faculty, and must be able to absorb others as they emerge from the unknown. Also it must discard what he finds to be erroneous in the faulty explanations which satisfied him in a past day. It is long since he abandoned his pristine belief that the winds are the breath of a god or the storm an exhibition of angry deity. The explanation of disease or a good harvest has passed out of the realm of theology into that of science; and in civilized countries a decreasing number would believe that their incidence could be affected by the interposition of a personal God. Religion if it is to command the adherence of modern man must be suited to modern man, and to the knowledge which his intellect has enabled him to acquire. If it is to fulfil its function of illuminating his path it must be a light and not a blackout. It will

command his belief and satisfy his need if, taking all that man has learned, it frames an answer as far as it can to the questions. It must try to solve the questions to which yet we have no simple answer. Faced with the great mystery of pain man must have at least a working hypothesis to account for this dread fact. Science can throw some light on it, but there will still be a margin of incomprehensibility which religion must try to illumine. Its light must not be the rush-lights of outworn superstition but the very best lamps which modern science can devise, and they must be used with readiness to accept new ones as the advance of science makes them out of date. Religion must be humbly willing to walk hand in hand with science, and instead of standing immutable on its authoritatively declared dogma it must be willing to accept change as the mind of man penetrates further and further into the dark forest of the unknown which encircles his little life. If the Christian churches are to recapture the allegiance which once they commanded they must sweep away an immense superstructure of doctrine which the modern mind quite refuses to accept. The difficulty is that they themselves doubtless fear that to demolish so much of the superstructure would mean destruction of what they hold to be essential. They must choose: either they will make vast sacrifices of age-long sacrosanct doctrine or they will cease to serve the religious needs of increasing millions.

What then will happen? Not forever will mankind be willing to live in a religious vacuum. Man must have the satisfaction which religion provides, and he will find it in some other place than in the churches and possibly in quite different ways. The real danger in which we live to-day is that with the loss of satisfaction of religious cravings the desire dies and reaches a state when men and women find sufficiency in spurious substitutes. Wonder can be quelled by half knowledge and if the mind is kept busy with the multifarious happenings of life and the imagination is fed on the thousand wonders that fill the world it will lose its utmost stretch into the vastness beyond. The desire to transcend self will be realized not by worship of the most high but by adoration of the somewhat higher. This has happened for millions who worship not God but prizefighters, film stars and machines. These are the golden calves of our time, and their chromium temples are very popular: millions flock to worship and readily pay a substantial fee for the privilege.

Is it really well that the high instincts of wonder and of awe should find their chief expression in these ways? If not what are we as a nation doing to change it? We have decided through an Act of Parliament that in every school in the land there shall be a daily act of worship. We have decided that a common scheme of scripture teaching shall be adopted in all schools where Christian children are taught, except where special religious instruction is given by the churches that control schools of their own. This means that in one of its various forms the Christian doctrine will be taught to children and they will become familiar with some form of

worship. Although a religious habit may be established in childhood it is very doubtful whether before adolescence the instincts basic to religious experience are mature enough for the formularies of religion to have any meaning or to find any real response. Further, it is doubtful how far in practice the act of worship in most schools will be more than a mechanical exercise evoking no spiritual fervour even among adolescents. Does experience show that the boy who has taken part in regular school worship to the age of eighteen tends to become a more religious man and a more regular worshipper in after life than those who have not been trained in the same conditions? And if it does, how far is it because in his economic class church-going has a higher social value than with the masses?

It will take more than universal school worship and the teaching of an agreed syllabus to fill the churches. This will happen only if men and women are conscious of the need to worship in a way that can be found nowhere else; they must feel this need so acutely that they want to forgo late rising on Sunday, and to that end sacrifice some of the amusements that keep them out of bed on Saturday; they must prefer church-going to taking exercise in the fresh air. There was a time when grown-ups attended church under the compulsion of social convention, and when the young attended under the compulsion of parents. Both these sanctions have disappeared, and it is well that they should have. Now, the compulsion, if it is to be there at all, must spring from real desire and self-determination.

That will happen only if faith is restored. From that the faculties of wonder and reverence can spring afresh. They are still there *in petto*; and indeed they are expressed in many ways short of religious worship. But it is faith that must come first, and there will be no faith that captures the spirit of men and women, boys and girls, and inspires them to ardour, unless it is suited to the stage of development that mankind has now reached. It is vain to imagine that what held the allegiance of the spirit and mind of man a thousand years ago, before his reason had enabled him to learn what he knows now of the phenomenal world, will serve to-day. It may not be different in its fundamental truths, but it must cast off the outworn accidentals which obscure its essential verities.

That is the first thing necessary. The second is to begin at any rate with the young and give them the experience of worship in a form that meets their needs of expressing awe and admiration, untrammelled by repugnant trappings. There is an immense opportunity in the Youth Service with its wide contacts with massed youth in the adolescent stage, when the need for religion is most clamant, to give opportunity for spiritual exercise. The practical difficulty is that only those leaders who are firm in some accepted faith are likely to be willing to give this opportunity and they are limited by the very faith which they hold. What is wanted is a courageous facing of the situation by Christians and agnostics to see how far they can together find, not an agreed syllabus, but a highest common

factor which will result in the youth of to-day having some opportunity to probe religious problems and to express themselves in religious worship. There are many men and women essentially religious who cannot subscribe to the accepted Christian creeds: some way must be found to break the barrier, at present impassable, between them and the Christians. If men and women, and we would say particularly young men and women, boys and girls, are to find spiritual exercise, comfort and resolution of their questionings in the churches there must be an immense sacrifice by the churches, a sacrifice of what at present seems to them to be essential, but which to millions of good and honest people seems to be at best unnecessary lumber and at worst an impassable barrier.

It is easy to lay the burden on priests, but they are not all-powerful. The church rightly claims to be a congregation of faithful men, and with the whole church it rests to determine the substance and form of its faith and practice. Nevertheless the priesthood has a place of power and influence which carries a special responsibility for thinking and guiding. It is true that there are priests who are more liberal than their flocks, but are there lively signs that the clergy are in the van of emancipation?

I have little hope that the Christians will make the sacrifice. To them it is all or nothing; and however great one's regret no one has a right to blame. You cannot blame a man for holding tenaciously to what seems to him to be a saving faith. What then is the prospect? I think several things will happen, but none can foresee the net result.

Probably the Christian churches at some points will make small concessions to meet the modern mind and in this way will slacken the tide of secession; but a negative policy of this kind will do more than delay a choice between radical change or slow destruction. Youth will not wait. It may follow a false god like the youth of Germany and dedicate its fervent spiritual energy to the service of a nationalistic moloch. That way lies destruction. Or it may go on stifling its questionings into silent agnosticism while finding sufficient outlet for its spiritual powers in the worship of the pinchbeck idols of sport and amusement—a well-stocked pantheon. That way also lies destruction—destruction by atrophy.

The only hope is that prophets will arise to formulate and preach a new religion based on a new conception of the glory of humanity and of life. It will start with the Christian ethic and its prime commandments to love God and to love man, and it must teach as never before how those commandments are but one. While denying the doctrine of essential human evil it will not deny the existence of evil or of sin. It will glory in the divine quality of man and find in him expressions of the divine as objects of worship and emulation. There lies a danger. The instinct to deify is still strong in the human mind. It is the Golden Bough that spread its noxious shade over Germany and much of Europe. For generations, until

reason has brought emancipation, the primitive instinct will remain powerful for man to cast his cares upon his fellow or his God. Christianity more than any other religion has managed to amalgamate this process by directing worship and trust to the personality of a god-man. A religion of humanism will be an effective reality only when the reason is sufficiently freed and developed for man to progress to a plane where primitive fictions of this sort are no longer necessary to satisfy his sense of weakness and fear. Essentially he will understand that the salvation of man lies in man, and he will trust to his own enlightened effort, although realizing his weakness and recognizing that many failures are inevitable in the path of progress. When he realizes that there is a course to follow and that the journey depends on his own fitness and endeavour he will once again have a faith.

The eye of hope sees this as inevitable, but if our darkness is not lightened, and quickly, we may fall into the pit of destruction. Man may perish. It must take many generations, perhaps centuries, before man walks by this new light, and that is why those who are charged with what light there is, bear so grave a responsibility. The burden of choice rests on them, because it is their present creeds which block the way. That is a hard saying: but it must be said. The decision lies primarily with the Christians because they are the occupants of the temple. We cannot compel entry, and if it is to be by attraction it is those within who must make it attractive and must clear the doorways. The young are hungering and are athirst: they will stem that hunger and quench that thirst somehow, or alternatively if they can find no meat or drink, desire will fail. Are the little children not to be suffered to come unto Him?

Law and Religion

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LAW is something more, if indeed it is not other, than technical rules. One has only to think of marriage and divorce, the relation of parents to children, everyday personal injury, freedom of speech, buying or selling a house, crime and delinquency, making a lease or a contract of employment—and so on—to perceive not merely that law touches all of us in many ways, but also that there is a great deal more in law than technicality.

Among the ancient Greeks, all citizens were lawyers, though paid orators wrote speeches. In the American colonies, lawyers were few and highly unpopular; clergy and laity, relying on the Bible, did not hesitate to serve as lawyers, judges, and legislators. Indeed, in this twentieth century, any reputable person could be admitted to the Bar in a number of states in the U.S.A.

If we attend to the study of law in various countries and times, it is again impossible to avoid the conclusion that the current specialization of the Bar is not a valid index to the nature of law. The study of law among the Greeks was part of a citizen's education. What we call jurisprudence was integrated in political science, itself involved in ethics and religion. In the mediaeval universities, the trivium, theology, law, and medicine, prevailed for centuries. Under the aegis of the Law Faculty, the humanities and social sciences were taught; and this continues to reflect the character of many European and South American law schools. So, too, in our Anglo-American tradition, the humanistic study of law, though largely ignored in legal circles, flowered in the hands of scholars who represented the finest cultural achievements of their times, e.g., Hale, Bentham, Maine, Maitland, Vinogradoff, and, in the United States, James Wilson, Story, Carter, Gray, Holmes, Cardozo, Pound, and many others.

Some few months ago in Washington a group of twenty scholars, representing institutions as far apart as Seattle and Maine, met under the auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies to explore the humanistic aspects of law. Historians, anthropologists, political scientists, economists, as well as law teachers, including those of canon, Roman, and civil law, discussed the cultural study of law and ways of re-establishing that in our universities.

These observations indicate the very wide ramifications of law. Implied therein is the philosophy that law is not merely a command of the Sovereign, backed by physical force, but that it is, in addition, a system of valuations and, finally, a cultural fact that permeates the whole fabric of social life. The distinctiveness of law inheres

not in any of its components nor in all of them, considered separately, but, instead, in its components fused in a unique configuration. Law is concerned with harms to social values which must, if necessary, be met by the application of physical sanctions in accordance with prescribed rules. Since law is a distinctive coalescence of form, fact, and value, nothing less than the totality of knowledge is relevant to a thorough understanding of its significance. So extensive a scheme of ideas, involving many types of evil-doing and, thus, the entire scale of values, so pervasive a social apparatus, involving the sanctioned use of force and, thus, dramatic impact on personality could hardly escape deep religious concern in all the ages of recorded history. Indeed, the history of ancient and primitive peoples shows such a close interpenetration of law and religion that the two dimensions of social life are often inseparable, and the lawyers are also the priests. The salient example in the modern world is found in some Mohammedan countries where the Koran continues to be the principal code of law.

But, granted that law influences every aspect of our social life and that it has always enlisted the concern of religious persons, is there not nevertheless a deep opposition between law and religion? Is not man confronted by an imperious necessity to choose either law or religion?

Tolstoy answered in a resounding affirmative, contrasting the "law of love" with the "law of violence." He urged "the recognition of love as the *supreme law* of life, not admitting, consequently, of any exception." This is the perspective of all-embracing anarchic love, and who would dismiss it out of hand? For is it not an insistent challenge to the individual to transcend mundane imperfection, including the limitations of any actual legal order? But in everyday social life, what is one to say not merely of self-defence against a murderous attack but of action, even killing if that is necessary, to save another's life? Tolstoy's position is understandable when it is recalled that he identified law with the brutal suppression of popular protest by a regime which pretended to rule by divine right.

Indiscriminate love, if it were possible, would be stultifying, indeed meaningless. If love is significant, it runs in rational channels and is relevant to actual problems. Actually to live a good life as a participant in any community involves responsibility, and that means not merely self-control but also control of others, i.e., the use of coercion. The problem of ignorance, alone, not to speak of fraud and violence, excludes indiscriminate love as irresponsible in the face of serious problems. Even in the intimacy of the family, the enforcement of rules is necessary, and nothing would be more cruel to a child than an undifferentiating approval of infraction and achievement alike. In a world of human beings the right use of power is the relevant issue.

A second position regarding the relation of law and religion was taken by Luther. He was not indifferent to law, as is some-

times alleged. But his emphasis was on the necessity of law rather than on the value of it. "If all the world were composed of real Christians," he said, "that is, true believers, no prince, king, lord, sword, or law would be needed." Evil, however, is rampant, hence God places the restraints of law on men, "otherwise the greatest sins in the world would remain unpunished." He believed that no matter how unjust or oppressive a law might be, it should be obeyed because, "the ruler is God's representative."

In a third, current, interpretation, law is seen not as an evil or a merely negative apparatus, but as the maintenance of conditions which permit the good life, including altruism and religion, to thrive; not as the repression of a few anti-social persons, but as a restraint on instinctual human nature; not as a tolerated necessity, but as a great educational institution. As Paul Tillich has written: "Indeed, law and institutions are demanded. They are demanded by love itself. For the individual, every individual, even the most creative, needs given structures which embody the experience and wisdom of the past, which liberate him from the necessity of innumerable decisions of his own, which show him a meaningful way of acting in most cases. This view of law and legal institutions receives its final significance in the law of democratic Societies. Such law is not merely the fiat of a physically supreme authority or a merely negative apparatus of compulsion, but is primarily a system of self-imposed rules embodying sound value judgments, the discoveries of citizens participating freely in the democratic process."

It would nonetheless be quite incorrect to conclude that there is no tension or disparity between law and religion. Law must be limited to reasonable expectation; religion spurs one on to attempt the heroic, to self-sacrifice, to a boundless consecration of all one is and has. For example, religion becomes especially important before a legal process starts and after it has run its course. An incident related by a prominent Detroit clergyman, Dr. M. S. Rice, illustrates this; and no doubt it is a commonplace. The head of a large family, a farmer, was suddenly stricken and died. There was a heavy mortgage on the farm and Dr. Rice called on the man who held the mortgage: "He said to me as I opened the door of his office and before I could tell my mission, 'Don't worry about the mortgage.' And that fine group of grief-bound children, strengthened by the offered comfort of those to whom the faith had been helpful, worked their way out of it all to a great victory. They paid that mortgage. They preserved their home."

This represents a very significant aspect of the relation of law to religion, which may be stated in this way: there is no law requiring anyone to enforce his legal rights. One may, if he wishes, start action or he may delay it or even omit it entirely. This is also true in large measure of public officials, particularly as regards criminal prosecution. Likewise, after a judgment has been entered, the creditor is free to allow it to remain dormant if he wishes. A

similar question confronts a lawyer who is asked to defend a person believed to be guilty of a crime which has aroused widespread bitter hostility. Unfortunately, some lawyers who have been moved by their sense of obligation to override their "sober judgment" have been ruined by their acceptance of such cases. So far as the law was concerned, they could have turned aside as other lawyers did.

Law imposes worldly sanctions of the cruder sort, and they often injure innocent persons, for instance, the family of a convicted offender. This is an instance of that human imperfection which, despite every effort, brings sadness even to those we love. In such situations religion can lighten the blow by enlisting economic aid, broadening perspectives, and suggesting the prospect of a better life. The offender himself has long been the object of religious solicitude, and it can hardly be doubted that many hardened criminals have been brought to a realization of their obligations by a religious awakening. So, too, religion can influence the community to which the former offender will one day return, so that he may have a chance to re-establish himself. Law is silent in such situations, and religion, filling the gap, strengthens the legal institution.

If we consider, not a saintly minority, but the general population, religion, like law, fosters the conditions of a good life. Both seek the maintenance of conditions that are conducive to the development of intelligent, balanced personalities which are sensitive to social values. But, while religion supports law in this endeavour, it cannot be content with the normal objectives and effects of legal institutions. It cannot rely only on the methods of the legal apparatus. It does not confine itself to external conformity or to reciprocity of obligations. Religion ventures confidently forth to capture the souls of men, to stir their imagination, and to guide their actions in that boundless nonlegal realm of mercy and devotion which lawyers solemnly call the scope of "privilege." This is the realm where no law commands or forbids any action, but where religion and enlightened conscience enrich a civilization.

On the other hand, from the beginning of a legal process to its conclusion, a court may take no exception to the rule of law on grounds of altruism or religion. A judge may think an action unfair or even immoral in the particular instance; he must apply the law nonetheless. To the casual observer, this seems harsh, but what is involved is simply the old maxim that one cannot have his cake and eat it too. This is sometimes forgotten even by legal scholars who would prefer to have a board decide each case on its merits without reference to law. But if one thinks that, on the whole, a government of law is better than dependence on the discretion of officials who enforce their decisions by the power of the state, then one recognizes that this means precisely that officials must not have unlimited discretion. The legislature may, of course,

change the existing law; and, no doubt, religion supplements morality in guiding judicial interpretation in those "interstitial" areas of uncertain law, where a judicial officer may properly legislate. This, however, does not alter the situation where a clear rule of law governs the facts in issue, though it is true that courts do not always adhere to the logic of a legal system nor to their duty. Nevertheless, there is a limit to even official lawlessness, which requires that if a legal order is to survive, law rather than conscience must be followed where they conflict. This, as Plato observed, concedes that only a second best world is attainable.

The relations of law and religion were discussed in detail in Plato's dialogues: Perfection exists only in a heaven of ideas culminating in the Good, the sun of life, transcendent and participating in all intelligible things. The Good is the perfect pattern to which the law of men should conform; but human wisdom is limited, and reason, inhibited by passion and cupidity, cannot comprehend the true being of the Good. Only the philosopher-king can do that, argued Plato. Our metaphysics and political ideals may well differ from Plato's. But if God's influence is operative in human affairs, the fruits of the suggestiveness of that influence, as comprehended by honest truthseekers, are incorporated in human enactments.

In defence of Plato, it should be recognized that he relied on wisdom to discover the divine pattern, conceding the impossibility "of obtaining from Him an ordinance." This is to be contrasted with the claim that God has granted certain persons an exclusive power of attorney to interpret his will and, thus, largely to determine the law of any society. One of the most acute analyses of the implications of such claims, which I have seen, and demonstrating the proficiency of theologians in textual interpretation (what lawyers call statutory construction) is Bishop Hoadly's sermon preached before King George I in March, 1717. He observed that the meaning of words changes and that, as he said, "A word, well-known and understood by those who first made use of it" may be altered "till it often comes to stand for a complication of notions, as distinct from the original intention of it, nay, as contradictory to it, as darkness is to light." If any human authority were appointed to interpret divine law (which the Bishop denied) "the consequence," he pointed out, "would be, that what still retains the name of the Church of Christ would not be the Kingdom of Christ, but the Kingdom of those men, vested with such authority . . . [for] whoever hath an absolute Authority to interpret any written or spoken laws; it is He, who is truly the Law-giver, to all Intents and Purposes; and not the Person who first wrote, or spoke them."

Because humility is characteristic of honest truth-seeking, *the use of power based on claims of unique divine authorization is antithetical to the discovery of right law in human relations*. Fortunately, however, education and popular enlightenment tend to relegate all

pretensions to divine right to the realm of paper formulas. In the difficult search for right law, *religion helps by restraining some of the claims of theology.*

Law is a major question in all the great political issues of our times, especially those concerning the freedom and coercion of human beings. Since such matters go to the very roots of religious concern, it would seem impossible for religious persons to remain aloof from the clash of democracy and authoritarianism. Participation is indeed widespread.

But the interesting and unfortunate fact is that religion does not speak an unequivocal language in this regard. One can readily understand why in Spain, for instance, no claim is put forth that religion implies and supports democracy. A problem arises when one finds thoughtful religious persons in England and the United States promoting aristocracy of a definitely theocratic character. Thus, T. S. Eliot hopes for rule by a religious elite and, being distrustful of human competence, he is nonetheless confident that, as he puts it, "the Church can say what is always and everywhere wrong." And in this country, a Harvard professor of philosophy sees authority as "the only escape . . . now facing the dying oligarchies or bourgeois anarchies of our era." He insists that "anarchy (democracy) can proceed no farther . . . Our great 'democracies' must go one way or the other. Order must be achieved. This order will be either a *true* order dictated by science, philosophy, and religion, the order of the Platonic-Christian state, or an *inverted* order, dictated by the mystical opinions and interests of the tyrant. There is no longer any way of postponing the choice."

The vagueness of these dire forebodings cannot obscure the fact that democracy, as we know it in the western world, is disparaged and repudiated and that instead of hoping for, let alone working for, a fuller realization of democratic values, this philosopher turns to authority, based not on popular consent but, again, of a theocratic character which in his term, will "dictate" order.

What is one to say of such a proposal put forth in the name of religion? That it represents an innocence of history is evident. Although it is clear that deeply religious individuals have lived in undemocratic ages, what puzzles me is how thoughtful religious persons who live in great democracies can ignore the values of human personality so abundantly manifested in the democratic process. Perhaps this is one of the situations which Scribner Ames had in mind when he said: "The fact that an interest is pursued in the name of religion does not guarantee that it is morally wholesome."

In any event, it seems clear that religion, alone, cannot solve the great political problems of our times however necessary it may be to their solution. Specifically, I am convinced a knowledge of the law and especially of the legal institutions of democratic societies is essential. As I have indicated, this does not mean knowledge of technical rules and procedures. It means knowledge of certain

precisely articulated moral ideas and of their daily operation in legal institutions. It means knowledge of the right and wrong uses of power, knowledge of the correct use of legitimate force to maximize the values of a community.

Lacking this knowledge, the poetic and philosophical aristocrats do not begin to appreciate the hard fact that law and, *a fortiori*, authority functioning without law, rest ultimately on overwhelming physical force. If they occasionally face that fact, they are apt to be indifferent to the crucial question: does the authority rest on the consent of the people or is it the authority of a dictator who is the unchallengeable judge of the superiority of his knowledge?

The proposal to substitute so-called "rational authority" for the democratic process implies drastic limitations on popular participation in law and government, a reversion of existing legal institutions. For example, the Bill of Rights, as manifested in the free exercise of religious worship, speech and press, freedom from illegal searches and seizures, and assurance of fair trial, could not survive authoritarian government, irrational or rational. For actual freedom of speech, e.g., implies the *efficacy* of the speaking, the decision of policy questions, and the adoption of the rules discovered. Can one honestly believe that any real freedom of speech would exist where the citizen's power was limited to the mere expression of advice which could, and undoubtedly often would be ignored? (And merely being "ignored" by a ruling elite is a stark euphemism, if we have learned anything from history!)

A knowledge of the Bill of Rights, especially of the great sacrifices required to win these basic guarantees, a knowledge of what it means in the daily life of a democratic people, and some familiarity with the rules and procedures that make the Bill of Rights no mere abstraction but a vital fact in democratic societies would enlighten religious aspiration in an area of vital concern.

A knowledge of the criminal law would be even more illuminating. Our law of crimes, especially that of the common law offences, is the product of many centuries of slow development, the outgrowth of customary, and therefore largely spontaneous, practices. Carefully tested in the light of experience, it conforms by and large to the moral standards of the community. If the supposed "rational authority" accepted this law, making only minor alterations, the unbounded claims of superior competence would be unsupported. If it attempted major revisions, can it be doubted that it would require merciless force to impose them on a recalcitrant society? We have had some demonstration of the actual meaning of scientific criminal law in recent European history, nor is there much evidence to believe that theocratic authority would mitigate the cruelty.

If, in the co-operative endeavour to discover right law, the pretension to exclusive divine authorization is the Scylla of religious participation, Positivism is its Charybdis. From Callicles to the present time, positivists have dismissed morality as a mask for

desire, a fraud to ensnare the simple-minded or, at best, as the wishful speculation of a dreamer, dependent for survival on myth and ideology. In that vein, law, too, is merely the interest of the stronger, the weapon of the "ruling class." Such repudiation of the existence of moral truth may be in part an honest revulsion either from claims of divine authorization or the evident masking of special interests. But after all proper discount has been allowed, Positivism is wholly inadequate to explain the legal progress of the Western societies.

Who, for instance, can examine the movement for penal reform in the eighteenth century and fail to recognize in the unsparing efforts of Romilly, Elizabeth Fry, and Howard, not only morality, but something more than that? Can factory regulation, slum clearance, the elimination of child labour, the treatment of juvenile delinquents, requirements for minimum education, minimum wages, and countless other ameliorative measures be explained in terms of a use of weapons by the so-called "ruling class"? Are they not much more credible as rational responses to the religious impulse that moved Theodore Parker, when he said:

"Give me the power to labour for mankind,
Make me the mouth of such as cannot speak;
Eyes let me be to groping men and blind,
... and to the weak
Let me be hands and feet."

No better instance of the distinctive offices of religion can be found than its function in relation to the problem of effective international and world law. On any scientific basis, world law is an illusion, the pathetic grasping at a straw by a drowning man. American experience in federalism, based, as it was, on common law, shared ideals, language, and historical background, offers little comfort as one regards the age-old conflicts and cultural divergencies of Europe, let alone Asia and Africa.

One of the most discouraging reports I have read regarding the prospects of achieving an effective international law, not to speak of an infinitely remote world law, is Mr. Justice Jackson's description of the Russian attitude in the Nuremberg trials. The decision, they said, has already been reached by the political leaders of the victorious powers. Since, in the Russian view, "a court is an institution that is an instrument of power in the hands of the ruling class," they thought it necessary only to tell the judges what to do. That a trial presupposes innocence, that a just decision is a rational finding based on evidence, that judges are independent, indeed, all that we regard as constituting the very essence of a fair trial was a matter of great puzzlement to the Russians. Said Mr. Justice Jackson: "... all through the proceedings ran the difficulty that they could not understand our concept of a court as an independent institution. and there are pages and pages in the volume recently published by the State Department in which we attempted to

explain to them the British and the American and the French concept of a court, but without too much success."

How can one surmount such barriers that go to the very foundations of our thinking about law and legal process? Good will and morality, unsupported by even the rudiments of an adequate social science, are vague and faltering guides. The vitally needed international legal order seems much too far off in a distant impenetrable future to be realized in any foreseeable time. And the knowledge of how to take even the preliminary steps in the right direction seems insignificant in our hour of need.

It is especially in such dark times and great needs that religion holds before men's eyes a vision of ultimate values, stresses elementary truths regarding human nature, and sustains the faith that man is not a lonely contestant in a purposeless universe but that God fights in him and with him to assure the infinite worth of the hard daily struggle in the right direction. Thus encouraged, the effort to establish and expand a sound legal order must advance.

To achieve that end, our modern world cries out for loyalties which will move men's spirits and rally their utmost energies. Where shall we turn in this great need at this critical time? I think we may turn to democracy vitalized by religion. Democracy, articulate in the precise, reasoned doctrines of the modern democratic state, can provide the tough, solid platform, the specific directions; but by itself, though wedded to moral values, it often falls short of enlisting a sufficient commitment. Democracy supported by a religion that is broad enough to transcend the particularities of culture will live not only in the minds of men; it will also stir their hearts, open the wellsprings of their devotion, and command their complete endeavour. Religion, so conceived and developed, might provide a common ethos, a universal spiritual foundation upon which an effective international law and world order could arise.

The Eagle and the Dove

E. SHIRVELL PRICE, M.A.

A Review of *D. H. Lawrence and Human Existence* by Father William Tiverton, with a Foreword by T. S. Eliot. Rockliff, 12/6.

THE times for a cult of D. H. Lawrence are, happily, past but if there is to be a revival of interest in his genius it is along the lines of Father Tiverton's discriminating piece of criticism that such a revival should come. This is the gist of Mr. Eliot's foreword, which we heartily endorse.

Remembering that it is a priest of an Anglican Order who is writing, we are reassured when, having set out to assess the significance for religion of Lawrence's perceptions on human

existence, he concludes that "Lawrence can teach Christians lessons they should have known but have forgotten." Is it cavilling to suggest that if Lawrence showed hostility to Christianity through a misunderstanding of the Church's teaching, surely the onus is upon the Church so to declare its mind that no man of Lawrence's sensitivity and keenness of perception could possibly misunderstand it.

We accept Father Tiverton's vindication of Lawrence against his critics in respect of his calibre as artist, critic and thinker. All this a very necessary preparation for getting Lawrence into true perspective.

And what is this true perspective? It is surely not in his life, which seems to have been a wrong-headed and impossible quest for peace and fulfilment, that we shall find the lasting significance of Lawrence. Rather is it in the *living* quality of his insights into the penumbra of human motives and emotions. He dug crude ore fresh from the earth and refined it to pure gold in the white heat of his mind. Lawrence never consciously and deliberately chose to serve the dark gods. Already, by nature, he was destined to serve them and be their mouthpiece. For a fully self-conscious and highly developed moral being this meant agony. I do not think that his concern with the victim in religious rites was either morbid or sadistic. That is how he experienced life. He was a Suffering Servant of his generation. New truth is not born except a man wrestle with his *daimon*.

It is strangely paradoxical that Lawrence, who could not abide bringing into clear consciousness the hinterland experiences of sex without feeling that the holy was made obscene, should, by his very office as prophet of the dark gods, be for ever drawing attention to, and causing folk to become ever more self-conscious about their emotional and passional life. Then, again, he found life—sensuous life—rich in so many ways other than the sexual, yet in his novels it would seem that his version of sex is his sole obsession. His poems and other literary writings, however, provide a corrective to such a judgment. Freud was far more *logical* in wishing to uncover and rationalise sexual impulse. But the question remains: was Freud's 'cure,' effected by the removal of all sense of sin, a truer answer than Lawrence's passionate apotheosis of sex. My answer is somewhat different from Father Tiverton's. Freud's 'cure' relieves the insupportable repression of guilt which has been engendered by a false sense of sin. But he has no real cure for the malady in the heart and soul of man, for man cannot be raised by the letting down of tensions. Lawrence's answer is to destroy the false sense of sin at its roots: for him there is only one sin, the sin against the Holy Spirit.

When Lawrence saw the Holy Spirit, symbolised in the Old Testament as an Eagle and, in the New Testament as a Dove and chose the Eagle, I feel that he was rejecting only spurious and

sentimental love. When he repudiates Love and exalts Power it is ultimately for the sake of Love that he does so. In the same way he repudiated spirituality. He rejected the world of his day for the falsity of its pretensions. He knew, and we know, that we rarely and only fitfully live by the Sermon on the Mount and that the world of human society hasn't really begun to implement Christianity in its institutions, the Church included.

In such a situation we must step back in order to step forward. He stepped back to draw strength from life itself. If the Church would recognise that Lawrence's dark gods are but the unknown and, perhaps, the unknowable side of the one true God; that God is both Power and Love!

Lawrence has his answer to the false dilemma which man repeatedly presents to himself in theology: that he must choose between Power and Love. For Lawrence, both Power and Love are rooted for man in the experience of Wonder. And it is in perennial wonder at things without and things within, at things above and things below that man is rooted in religion and lives in God.

Father Tiverton takes us far but he hardly takes me far enough. The passages from Lawrence's *Letters* and *Phoenix* which he finds significant are just those which I marked and quoted in sermons and lectures in the mid thirties. But I am grateful to him for renewing and confirming the experience of illumination and exaltation which Lawrence, along with Blake, Shelley, Milton and Shakespeare never fail to arouse in me.

Lawrence had a profound theological as well as a spiritual insight. "Ask any philosopher or theologian," he said, "and he'll tell you that the real problem isn't whether God exists or not. God always is and we all know it. But the problem is, how to get at Him. The theologians try to find out. How shall man put himself into relation to God? Which is: How shall Man *find* God? That's the real problem."

But Lawrence was not by nature a theologian but a prophet and was therefore more true to his genius when he wrote:

"It is not easy to fall out of the hands of the living God.

They are so large, and they cradle so much of a man.

It is a long time before a man can get himself away.

Even through the greatest blasphemies, the hands of the living God still continue to cradle him."

The Significance of the Dead Sea Scrolls

Professor MARCEL SIMON, of Strasbourg

MUCH has already been written about the Dead Sea Scrolls. But the last word has certainly not yet been said, and the discussion which this amazing discovery has raised is not likely to come to an end for a long time.

In April 1947 a Bedouin, travelling to Jericho, found in a cave a few miles North-West of the Dead Sea, jars containing scroll manuscripts, of which he took some with him. After long and complicated negotiation, part of the precious scrolls was bought by the American School in Jerusalem, and the others were purchased by the Hebrew University. There are good reasons to assume that far more manuscripts had been hidden in the cave than have been recovered. Probably the larger part has been destroyed, either by human hands, or by the mere effect of time; some may even have been stolen since the discovery and will perhaps re-appear some day. In the present state of things, we only know a small part of what used to be a large library. Among the preserved manuscripts are two complete copies of the book of Isaiah, in its canonical form, a commentary on Habakkuk (chaps. 1-2), a manual of discipline and rules of the sect to which the library belonged, a book entitled by Prof. Sukenik *The War between the Sons of Light and the Sons of Darkness*, a collection of hitherto unknown psalms and fragments of various canonical books of the Old Testament, as well as of Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha. The whole lot is written in Hebrew with the only exception of an Aramaic Apocalypse of Lamech.

There can be no doubt about the authenticity of the documents. But the chronological problem is most complicated. This problem is of capital importance, for the interest and significance of the manuscripts largely depend on its solution. If the scrolls, or rather the texts—excluding of course the biblical—are later than the beginning of the Christian era, the discovery only concerns the history of Judaism, and its sectarian life. If they are pre-Christian, then they will possibly throw some new light on the origins and early developments of Christianity.

There has been so far no agreement among the scholars on this point. The various datings put forward cover a range of over a thousand years. Some would assign the texts to the second or even third century B.C. Some think they cannot be older than the 6th Century A.D. Dr. Weis of Manchester University, has even attempted, without much success in my opinion, to put the composition of the Habakkuk Commentary in the last years of the 11th

Century, in relation with the first Crusade! Among the exponents of a late dating are men of outstanding authority such as Professor Driver and Professor Zeitlin. But I do not find their arguments in this case really convincing. If we take into account the whole available evidence it rather supports a pre-Christian date of most of the texts, if not necessarily of all the manuscripts; and the majority of the competent scholars actually incline towards this conclusion. The jars, which cannot be much older than the scrolls which they contained, and possibly were made specially for this purpose are, by the archaeologists, declared to be undoubtedly Hellenistic, that is to say, not later than the middle of the first century B.C.

The paleography of the manuscripts points in the same direction; the scrolls are written in so-called square Hebrew, but represent a rather early form of this writing. They are, in this respect, closely related to the Nash Papyrus written somewhere about the beginning of the Christian era, which was hitherto the oldest known fragment of a biblical manuscript. Some orthographic and philological peculiarities could, according to Dr. Weis, be ascribed to Arabic influences. But this is probably not the only possible explanation. For a new method—isotype test—for determining the age of archaeological material, applied to some of the linen in which the scrolls were wrapped, puts the date of their packing somewhere between the middle of the 2nd century B.C. and the middle of the 3rd century A.D. Both the archaeological argument and the intrinsic evidence from the texts themselves point to the earlier part of the period thus delimited. Some scholars are even more explicit, and put forth, for the redaction of the texts, the writing of the manuscripts and even the hiding of the scrolls, various precise dates, either in the 2nd or the 1st century B.C. I can give no detailed analysis of their argument here. Let it suffice for the moment to note that there is a probability for the documents being pre-Christian.

They bear witness to the extreme complexity of religious life in Israel towards the beginning of the Christian era. It is now generally admitted that the group to whose library the scrolls belonged was identical with the Sect of the New Covenant which was revealed to us by the so-called Zadokite work, re-discovered in Cairo in 1910. There were considerable divergencies among the scholars as to the date of that work. Its close association with some of the scrolls, in particular the Habakkuk Commentary, seems to solve the problem, as the two documents are probably almost contemporary and both belong to the same sect, possibly at two successive stages of its development.

Some connection between this sect and the Essenes is at least very likely, but cannot be described very precisely in the present state of our information. One of the documents expounds the rules of the sect, which had a strongly ritualistic and legalistic character.

And in the Commentary on Habakkuk we hear, in allegorical terms, of the hostility it endured from the priestly party in Jerusalem. We already know from the Zadokite work, that this sect was compelled to flee from Palestine to Damascus. Some would think that it was on that occasion that the scrolls were hidden in the cave. Others assume that they were deposited later, when the group had come back to Palestine, and was once more in danger, possibly during the great war of 66-70 A.D.

The anonymous leader of the Sect described in the Commentary, as well as in the Zadokite work, as "the Teacher of Righteousness" was persecuted, mishandled and perhaps even killed by "the Evil Priest" who is also called "the Man of the Lie." But he soon took a posthumous revenge: he is, according to the Habakkuk Commentary, the author of a mysterious catastrophe which befell his adversaries on the day of Atonement. Professor Dupont-Sommer of Paris thinks that this alludes to the conquest of Jerusalem by Pompey, which occurred on that very day, in 63 B.C. In his opinion the terms "Evil Priest" refer at times to Aristobulus II, who died in 49 B.C. and at others to his brother, rival and successor, Hyrcanus II, who was taken prisoner by the Parthians in 40 B.C. The composition of the Commentary could thus be put between these two dates. Professor Goossens of Brussels, in full agreement with Professor Dupont-Sommer's conclusion, goes one step further: the Teacher of Righteousness is to be identified with a certain Onias, called in the Talmud "Honi ha Meaggel" whom we know precisely from Josephus to have been stoned by the troops of Hyrcanus II, while they were besieging Aristobulus II in Jerusalem in 65 B.C.

These attractive identifications are, in my opinion, very likely. It cannot, however, be said that they solve every difficulty. Some scholars still think that the Commentary on Habakkuk and the whole complex of events to which it refers would fit in with the Maccabean period better than with the early years of Roman domination over Palestine. Father de Vaux of the French school in Jerusalem thinks that the flight from Palestine and the hiding of the manuscripts took place in the reign of Alexander Jannaeus, that is to say, between 103 and 76 B.C.

However this may be, the interesting fact is that the probability for a pre-Christian origin of the texts is very strong. Consequently they may help to our understanding of early Christianity.

Between the Community of the New Covenant and early Christianity there are considerable differences, sufficient, in my opinion, to exclude the hypothesis of a direct derivation. The Sect, although it stands outside official Judaism, is none the less of a definitely legalistic and ritualistic type, in full contrast to the message of Jesus, and to every shade of Christianity, with the only exception of the Ebionites. But there are also close and striking analogies. Both groups live in an eschatological atmosphere. They are, together with many Jews, expecting the fulfilment of time which both

believe to be near at hand. But to both the Day of Jahveh is connected with the second coming of their master, who will then judge the world. Only those who believe in him will be saved. Through him is "the Holy Spirit of God" revealed to the elect. And even as Jesus is, in the belief of his followers, lifted up above humanity, so is the Teacher of Righteousness. Professor Dupont-Sommer, however, goes probably too far when he describes him as pre-existent, and speaks of his incarnation and redemptive power. But about his exaltation at the right hand of God, so to say, there can be little doubt. And it seems at least very likely that, to his disciples, the expected Messiah would be a reincarnation of their Master who, meanwhile, had been called to heavenly glory, not in spite of, but because of his passion. It is no longer possible, after the discovery of the scrolls, to maintain that the idea of a suffering Messiah was thoroughly alien to the Jewish mind.

How then are these analogies to be interpreted? Neither by identifying the two movements—which nobody, I think, has done—nor by considering Christianity as a mere offspring of the Sect of the New Covenant: for the spirit, as I have just pointed out, is not exactly the same in both cases. The best explanation is probably to admit that Christianity, although it is not directly derived from the Sect, developed in an atmosphere largely influenced by it. A certain number of conceptions which are at the very core of early Christology were possibly borrowed from the Sect. Or at least they may have been transmitted to the Church through that sectarian ideology, which worked them out for the first time, with the help of such Biblical figures as the Suffering Servant in Deutero-Isaiah.

In Ebionite quarters, a closer and more precise connection is not unlikely: some of the disciples of the Teacher of Righteousness might well have been won to the Gospel, either by Jesus himself or by his followers, and consequently, without giving up their own legalistic ideal of religious life, might have contributed in shaping the Judaistic type of Christianity; there are, in fact, some features which would point in that direction, and fit in with the picture Professor Schoeps has given of Ebionism in his recent book *Theologie und Geschichte des Judenchristentums*.

More generally speaking, the link between early Christianity and that marginal Judaism, whose considerable influence in the religious life of Palestine is clearly illustrated by the scrolls, appears much closer than it was hitherto supposed to be. The early developments of Christology, in which a capital part is commonly assigned to St. Paul, tending to an apotheosis of Jesus and his more and more complete identification with the Father, are often explained by the influence of Hellenistic religious thought. And this influence has indeed probably been of great importance in that process of evolution. But it becomes more and more evident that Jewish monotheism, at least in those circles which stood outside the grasp and control of Jerusalem and official theology, was not quite so rigid as one

was inclined to think. Pauline Christology still vigorously contrasts with the Christology of the first Palestinian disciples, but it does not stand in such radical opposition to Jewish thought as a whole as was commonly held.

It will be necessary, in the light of the new discovery, to establish whether the mark of sectarian Judaism also appears in the rites and institutions of the ancient Church. It can already be noted that one root of at least some Pauline and "Hellenistic" conceptions is to be found in the documents of the New Covenant. They illustrate, just as do the Wisdom literature and the works of Philo, the great variety of shades within Judaism at the beginning of the Christian era. It becomes obvious that Christianity is indeed a genuine product of Judaism, but of a Judaism which, in spite of its exclusiveness, was open to various influences and took many different forms. And it may be assumed with great probability that this type of sectarian Judaism revealed to us in the scrolls has played an important part in the rise and growth of Christianity.

The Enfranchisement of Science

R. F. RATTRAY, M.A., Ph.D.

A Review of *Science and the Quest for God*. By Alister C. Hardy, M.A., D.SC., F.R.S., Linacre Professor of Zoology, Oxford. The Essex Hall Lecture, 1951. The Lindsey Press. 1s. 8d. post free.

ANYONE acquainted with the scientific world of to-day must admire Professor Hardy's courage in struggling out of its strait-waistcoat. When science was fighting for freedom against orthodox theology, only a few with deep insight saw that science, partly in reaction against orthodoxy in theology, would presently develop orthodoxy as rigid within itself. In modern specialization it is almost impossible for a scientist to be philosophical—and philosophy is now "scientific." It is very hard for a man rich in the experience of departmentalized knowledge to enter the kingdom. Under the terrific pressure of scientific convention, the simplest fallacies in thinking have been committed. In this lecture Professor Hardy notices the misuse of "Occam's Razor"—"In thought, entities are not to be multiplied beyond what is necessary." Of course not. But if you *a priori* exclude mind from the field of investigation of biology, you can easily slide into the logical fallacy of assuming that it is not necessary to introduce mind. You then multiply entities of genes and molecules and atoms surreptitiously endowed with powers of constructing most complicated organisms, keeping them in wonderful balances, influencing each other and so on—and all this in the name of a theory of *particulate inheritance*!

In the address Professor Hardy gave at Leeds, published in *Faith and Freedom* in 1949, he expressly dissociated himself from the

Lamarckian-Butlerian interpretation of evolution. On the kind invitation of the editor of *Faith and Freedom*, I tackled him about this in its pages. Then Professor Hardy gave his Presidential address to the Zoology Section of the British Association. I listened to the report on the wireless and, to my astonishment, Professor Hardy had not only repeated that he believed in telepathy but said that this might provide an eirenicon between orthodox biology and Butlerism! Look at the implications: (1) that consciousness can communicate without sensible means of communication (2) that biological entities may so communicate (e.g. genes). But if biological entities can so communicate, they must have minds. Owing to the highly specialized conditions of modern science, it is possible that Professor Hardy does not know that in a recent book the eminent botanist, Professor Tansley, used the phrase "vegetable consciousness"—or that the highly-qualified reviewer in *The Spectator* endorsed this as "a legitimate phrase."

Does it make sense to posit that atoms have no mind in them and yet believe that if they are arranged by purely physical and accidental forces in varieties of combinations, they can be surreptitiously endowed like artists, men of religion and the like? Professor Hardy is far too modest in his argument. It is not merely a question of artists and men of religion: Mr. Harold Nicolson has pointed out that there are multitudes of little quirks of body and mind that are inherited. Now if orthodox biology is going to tell us that every one of these has been produced by a particulate physical entity, this is not science, this is mere belief, and who is doing the multiplying of entities? Dürken, *Experimental Analysis of Development*, 1932, emphasized the numerical impossibility of the existence in the gamete chromosomes of a gene or factor for every character. And when is orthodox biology going to tell us when and how the genes acquired the characters that are admittedly inherited? What cognisance does orthodox biology take of the findings of the greatest modern psychologists? Freud, Jung and McDougall all maintained that mind is inherited.

Orthodox biologists of the school of Dr. Julian Huxley have got themselves into a hopeless dilemma: on the one hand they say that there is nothing that matters in race and that all depends on environment; on the other hand they say that most of what matters is inherited. If we look beyond the narrow confines of the laboratory into the laboratory of the world, we see, as a result of caste in India, Brahmins born with abnormal memories and children with abnormal endowment in mathematics, we see born fighters and hereditary craftsmen with amazing skills.

These discussions are essential for the religious issue Professor Hardy so courageously espouses. Yes, behind matter is mind and behind mind is spirit and the ultimate spirit behind the universe is God and in our world all depends on how individuals behave. If they behave badly, they develop bad habits and these can, especially

with inbreeding of individuals with bad habits, become hereditary. If they behave well, they develop good habits and these can, especially with inbreeding of individuals with good habits, become hereditary. To be sure, in sexual reproduction the inherited factors are constantly being reshuffled but, as Professor Hardy himself testifies, the organism feels for successful results.

It is impossible in the space available to deploy the facts and arguments that seem to me to carry Professor Hardy's main argument further.*

The history of our world is one of progress—from chaos to order—from algae to humus, mosses, sedges, grasses, willows, hazels, alders, oaks. The vegetable kingdom was once green only and flowerless: then came flowers—first white, then pink, red, purple and then royal blue. Mr. Harold Speed, the artist, wrote: "Beauty has survival value. Extinct animals look alarmingly ugly. There is more beauty in the world to-day than at the beginning of things or even when primitive, hairy man appeared." If it had been possible to make a film of creation throughout the ages and project it in a time within the compass of our apprehension, should we not be spellbound? Sir Mohammad Iqbal wrote, "The plant growing, the animal developing a new organ, and a human being receiving light from the inner depths of life, are all cases of inspiration." Bernard Shaw wrote: "Some power, which we must accept dogmatically because we see a good deal of what it does, uses various means. It shapes them into various forms. It sets them willing and working for a time, some for moments, some for years, some for centuries. They use up their substances and gather more to replace them, until they fail and the materials return to the elements. This power makes living entities that will act of their own accord, endowed with consciousness, purpose, will, pride in efficiency, and shame when they act badly." This, no doubt, is what Wordsworth felt when he said that he had a sense of something far more deeply interfused in the ocean and in the air and in man. We can now see that Shelley was literally correct when he wrote of the plastic stress that sweeps through the dull, dense world, bursting in its beauty and its might from trees and beasts and men into the heaven's light.

"What magnets far away control our actions here?

What mystic messages vibrating from the sky?

What shuttles throw the woof whose warp is all we know?"

Professor Hardy has courageously given a lead from the scientific cohorts towards meeting the bands of artists and men of religion. It looks as if, at long last, it is beginning to be seen that the great issue before the world is the harmonizing of true science and true religion, to the great advantage of both.

* We refer readers to Dr. Rattray's article on "Heredity" in *The Quarterly Review* for July, 1950, and one on "Creation" about to appear in the same journal.—Ed.